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Abstract. We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopt-
ing a rather strict definition of correctness—guaranteeing that honest players obtain
their correct outcomes only—we can show that every strictly correct quantum pro-
tocol implementing a non-trivial classical primitive necessarily leaks information to
a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial prim-
itives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage
is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our
framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third
party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot
amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against
quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but pu-
rify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As
concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal
two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.
Keywords: two-party cryptography, quantum protocols, quantum information the-
ory, information leakage.
1 Introduction
Quantum communication allows to implement tasks which are classically impossible. The
most prominent example is quantum key distribution [BB84] where two honest players es-
tablish a secure key against an eavesdropper. In the two-party setting however, quantum
and classical cryptography often show similar limits. Oblivious transfer [Lo97], bit commit-
ment [May97,LC97], and even fair coin tossing [Kit03] are impossible to realize securely
both classically and quantumly. On the other hand, quantum cryptography allows for some
weaker primitives impossible in the classical world. For example, quantum coin-flipping pro-
tocols with maximum bias of 1√
2
− 12 exist5 against any adversary [CK09] while remaining
impossible based solely on classical communication. A few other weak primitives are known
to be possible with quantum communication. For example, the generation of an additive
⋆ A previous version of this article as appeared at ASIACRYPT 2009 [SSS09].
5 In fact, protocols with better bias are known for weak quantum coin flip-
ping [Moc04,Moc05,Moc07].
secret-sharing for the product xy of two bits, where Alice holds bit x and Bob bit y, has
been introduced by Popescu and Rohrlich as machines modeling non-signaling non-locality
(also called NL-boxes) [PR94]. If Alice and Bob share an EPR pair, they can simulate an
NL-box with symmetric error probability sin2 π8 [PR94,BLM
+05]. Equivalently, Alice and
Bob can implement 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (1-2-ot) privately provided the receiver
Bob gets the bit of his choice only with probability of error sin2 π8 [Amb05]. It is easy to
verify that even with such imperfection these two primitives are impossible to realize in the
classical world. This discussion naturally leads to the following question:
– Which two-party cryptographic primitives are possible to achieve using quantum com-
munication?
Most standard classical two-party primitives have been shown impossible to implement
securely against weak quantum adversaries reminiscent to the classical honest-but-curious
(HBC) behavior [Lo97]. The idea behind these impossibility proofs is to consider parties that
purify their actions throughout the protocol execution. This behavior is indistinguishable
from the one specified by the protocol but guarantees that the joint quantum state held by
Alice and Bob at any point during the protocol remains pure. The possibility for players to
behave that way in any two-party protocol has important consequences. For instance, the
impossibility of quantum bit commitment follows from this fact [May97,LC97]: After the
commit phase, Alice and Bob share the pure state |ψx〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB corresponding to the
commitment of bit x. Since a proper commitment scheme provides no information about
x to the receiver Bob, it follows that trA |ψ0〉〈ψ0| = trA |ψ1〉〈ψ1|. In this case, the Schmidt
decomposition guarantees that there exists a unitary U0,1 acting only on Alice’s side such
that |ψ1〉 = (U0,1⊗ IB)|ψ0〉. In other words, if the commitment is concealing then Alice can
open the bit of her choice by applying a suitable unitary transform only to her part. A similar
argument allows to conclude that 1-2-ot is impossible [Lo97]: Suppose Alice is sending the
pair of bits (b0, b1) to Bob through 1-2-ot. Since Alice does not learn Bob’s selection bit, it
follows that Bob can get bit b0 before undoing the reception of b0 and transforming it into
the reception of b1 using a local unitary transform similar to U0,1 for bit commitment. For
both these primitives, privacy for one player implies that local actions by the other player
can transform the honest execution with one input into the honest execution with another
input.
In this paper, we investigate the cryptographic power of two-party quantum protocols
against players that purify their actions while trying to implement a classical primitive. This
quantum honest-but-curious (QHBC) behavior is the natural quantum version of classical
HBC behavior. This class of adversaries was recently called (perfectly) specious in [DNS10]. It
contains all adversaries that could prove to a judge, at any step during a protocol execution,
that the joint state (up to an adversary’s local computation) is the honest one. We consider
classical primitives providing Alice and Bob with random variable X and Y respectively
according distribution PX,Y . Any such PX,Y models a two-party cryptographic primitive
where neither Alice nor Bob provide input. For the purpose of this paper, this model is
general enough since any two-party primitive with inputs can be randomized (Alice and
Bob pick their input at random) so that its behavior can be described by a suitable joint
probability distribution PX,Y . If the classical primitive with inputs f : A × B → W × Z
is implemented securely by some protocol πf then it must also remain secure when Alice’s
and Bob’s private input (a, b) ∈R A × B is picked uniformly at random. In this case, the
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joint probability distribution PX,Y implemented by πf is simply:
PX,Y ((a, w), (b, z)) =
Pr (f(a, b) = (w, z))
|A| · |B| .
If the randomized version PX,Y is shown to be impossible to implement securely by any
quantum protocol then the original primitive with inputs must also be impossible.
Any quantum protocol implementing PX,Y must produce, when both parties purify their
actions, a joint pure state |ψ〉 ∈ HAA′ ⊗ HBB′ that, when subsystems of A and B are
measured in the computational basis, leads to outcomes X and Y according the distribution
PX,Y . Notice that the registers A
′ and B′ only provide the players with extra working space
and, as such, do not contribute to the output of the functionality (so parties are free to
measure them the way they want). In this paper, we adopt a somewhat strict point of view
and define a quantum protocol π for PX,Y to be strictly correct if and only if the correct
outcomes X,Y are obtained and the registers A′ and B′ do not provide any additional
information about Y and X respectively since otherwise π would be implementing a different
primitive PXX′,Y Y ′ rather than PX,Y . The state |ψ〉 produced by any strictly correct protocol
for PX,Y is what we call a quantum embedding of PX,Y . An embedding is called regular if
registers A′ and B′ are empty. Any embedding |ψ〉 ∈ HAA′ ⊗ HBB′ can be produced in
the QHBC model by the trivial protocol asking Alice to generate |ψ〉 before sending the
quantum state in HBB′ to Bob. It follows that in the QHBC model, any embedding of PX,Y
corresponds to a strictly correct protocol and, since any protocol implementing PX,Y can be
purified in the bare model, any strictly correct protocol generates some embedding of PX,Y
in the QHBC model.
Notice that if X and Y were provided privately to Alice and Bob—through a trusted
third party for instance—then the expected amount of information one party gets about the
other party’s output is minimal and can be quantified by the Shannon mutual information
I(X ;Y ) between X and Y . Assume that |ψ〉 ∈ HAA′ ⊗ HBB′ is an embedding of PX,Y
produced by a strictly correct quantum protocol. We define the leakage of |ψ〉 as
∆ψ := max {S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) , S(Y ;AA′)− I(Y ;X) } , (1)
where S(X ;BB′) (resp. S(Y ;AA′)) is the information the quantum registers BB′ (resp.
AA′) provide about the output X (resp. Y ). That is, the leakage is the maximum amount of
extra information about the other party’s output given the quantum state held by one party.
It turns out that S(X ;BB′) = S(Y ;AA′) holds for all embeddings, exhibiting a symmetry
similar to its classical counterpart I(X ;Y ) = I(Y ;X) and therefore, the two quantities we
are taking the maximum of in (1) coincide.
1.1 Contributions
Our first contribution establishes that the notion of leakage is well behaved. We show that
the leakage of any embedding for PX,Y is lower bounded by the leakage of some regular
embedding of the same primitive. Thus, in order to lower bound the leakage of any strictly
correct implementation of a given primitive, it suffices to minimize the leakage over all its
regular embeddings. We also show that the only non-leaking embeddings are the ones for
trivial primitives, where a primitive PX,Y is said to be (cryptographically) trivial if it can
be generated by a classical protocol against HBC adversaries6. It follows that any quantum
6 We are aware of the fact that our definition of triviality encompasses cryptographically interesting
primitives like coin-tossing and generalizations thereof for which highly non-trivial protocols
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protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive PX,Y must leak information under the sole
assumption that it produces (X,Y ) with the right joint distribution. This extends known
impossibility results for two-party primitives to all non-trivial primitives.
Embeddings of primitives arise from protocols where Alice and Bob have full control
over the environment. Having in mind that any embedding of a non-trivial primitive leaks
information, it is natural to investigate what tasks can be implemented without leakage with
the help of a trusted third party. The notion of leakage can easily be adapted to this scenario.
We show that no cryptographic two-party primitive can be implemented without leakage
with just one call to the ideal functionality of a weaker primitive7. This new impossibility
result does not follow from the ones known since they all assume that the state shared
between Alice and Bob is pure.
We then turn our attention to the leakage of strictly correct protocols for a few concrete
universal primitives. From the results described above, the leakage of any strictly correct
implementation of a primitive can be determined by finding the (regular) embedding that
minimizes the leakage. In general, this is not an easy task since it requires to find the eigen-
values of the reduced density matrix ρA = trB |ψ〉〈ψ| (or equivalently ρB = trA |ψ〉〈ψ|). As
far as we know, no known results allow us to obtain a non-trivial lower bound on the leakage
(which is the difference between the mutual information and accessible information) of non-
trivial primitives. One reason being that in our setting we need to lower bound this difference
with respect to a measurement in one particular basis. However, when PX,Y is such that
the bit-length of either X or Y is short, the leakage can be computed precisely. We show
that any strictly correct implementation of 1-2-ot necessarily leaks 12 bit. Since NL-boxes
and 1-2-ot are locally equivalent, the same minimal leakage applies to NL-boxes [WW05b].
This is a stronger impossibility result than the one by Lo [Lo97] since he assumes per-
fect/statistical privacy against one party while our approach only assumes strict correctness
(while both approaches apply even against QHBC adversaries). We finally show that for
Rabin-OT and 1-2-ot of r-bit strings (i.e. rotr and 1-2-otr respectively), the leakage ap-
proaches 1 exponentially in r. In other words, strictly correct implementations of these two
primitives trivialize as r increases since the sender gets almost all information about Bob’s
reception of the string (in case of rotr) and Bob’s choice bit (in case of 1-2-otr). These
are the first quantitative impossibility results for these primitives and the first time the
hardness of implementing different flavors of string OT is shown to increase as the strings
to be transmitted get longer.
Finally, we note that our lower bounds on the leakage of the randomized primitives also
lower-bound the minimum leakage for the standard versions of these primitives8 where the
players choose their inputs uniformly at random. While we focus on the typical case where
the primitives are run with uniform inputs, the same reasoning can be applied to primitives
with arbitrary distributions of inputs.
exist [Moc07,CK09]. However, the important fact (for the purpose of this paper) is that all these
primitives can be implemented by trivial classical protocols against HBC adversaries.
7 The weakness of a primitive will be formally defined in terms of entropic monotones for classical
two-party computation introduced by Wolf and Wullschleger [WW04], see Section 4.2.
8 The definition of leakage of an embedding can be generalized to protocols with inputs, where it is
defined as max{supVB S(X;VB)− I(X;Y ) , supVA S(VA;Y )− I(X;Y )}, where X and Y involve
both inputs and outputs of Alice and Bob, respectively. The supremum is taken over all possible
(quantum) views VA and VB of Alice and Bob obtained by their (QHBC-consistent) actions (and
containing their inputs).
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1.2 Related Work
Our framework allows to quantify the minimum amount of leakage whereas standard impos-
sibility proofs as the ones of [LC97,May97,Lo97,AKSW07,BCS12] do not in general provide
such quantification since they usually assume privacy for one player in order to show that the
protocol must be totally insecure for the other player9. By contrast, we derive lower bounds
for the leakage of any strictly correct implementation. At first glance, our approach seems
contradictory with standard impossibility proofs since embeddings leak the same amount
towards both parties. To resolve this apparent paradox it suffices to observe that in previous
approaches only the adversary purified its actions whereas in our case both parties do. If
a honest player does not purify his actions then some leakage may be lost by the act of
irreversibly and unnecessarily measuring some of his quantum registers.
Our results complement the ones obtained by Colbeck in [Col07] for the setting where
Alice and Bob have inputs and obtain identical outcomes (called single-function computa-
tions). [Col07] shows that in any strictly correct implementation of primitives of a certain
form, an honest-but-curious player can access more information about the other party’s in-
put than it is available through the ideal functionality. Unlike [Col07], we deal in our work
with the case where Alice and Bob do not have inputs but might receive different outputs
according to a joint probability distributions. We show that only trivial distributions can
be implemented securely in the QHBC model. Furthermore, we introduce a quantitative
measure of protocol-insecurity that lets us answer which embedding allow the least effective
cheating.
Another notion of privacy in quantum protocols, generalizing its classical counterpart
from [CK91,Kus92], is proposed by Klauck in [Kla04]. Therein, two-party quantum protocols
with inputs for computing a function f : X × Y → Z, where X and Y denote Alice’s and
Bob’s respective input spaces, and privacy against QHBC adversaries are considered. Privacy
of a protocol is measured in terms of privacy loss, defined for each round of the protocol and
fixed distribution of inputs PX′,Y ′ by S(B;X |Y ) = H(X |Y )−S(X |B, Y ), where B denotes
Bob’s private working register, and X := (X ′, f(X ′, Y ′)), Y := (Y ′, f(X ′, Y ′)) represent the
complete views of Alice and Bob, respectively. Privacy loss of the entire protocol is then
defined as the supremum over all joint input distributions, protocol rounds, and states of
working registers. In our framework, privacy loss corresponds to S(X ;Y B)− I(X ;Y ) from
Alice point’s of view and S(Y ;XA) − I(X ;Y ) from Bob’s point of view. Privacy loss is
therefore very similar to our definition of leakage except that it requires the players to get
their respective honest outputs. As a consequence, the protocol implementing PX,Y by asking
one party to prepare a regular embedding of PX,Y before sending her register to the other
party would have no privacy loss. Moreover, the scenario analyzed in [Kla04] is restricted
to primitives which provide the same output f(X,Y ) to both players. Another difference is
that since privacy loss is computed over all rounds of a protocol, a party is allowed to abort
which is not considered QHBC in our setting. In conclusion, the model of [Kla04] is different
from ours even though the measures of privacy loss and leakage are similar. [Kla04] provides
interesting results concerning trade-offs between privacy loss and communication complexity
of quantum protocols, building upon similar results of [CK91,Kus92] in the classical scenario.
9 Trade-offs between the security for one and the security for the other player have been consid-
ered before, but either the relaxation of security has to be very small [Lo97] or the trade-offs
are restricted to particular primitives such as commitments [SR01,BCH+08] or oblivious trans-
fer [CKS13].
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It would be interesting to know whether a similar operational meaning can also be assigned
to the new measure of privacy, introduced in this paper.
A result by Ku¨nzler et al. [KMR09] shows that two-party functions that are securely
computable against active quantum adversaries form a strict subset of the set of functions
which are securely computable in the classical HBC model. This complements our result
that the sets of securely computable functions in both HBC and QHBC models are the
same.
A recent paper by Fehr, Katz, Song, Zhou and Zikas [FKS+13] studies our question
with respect to the stricter requirements of universal composability. They give classifica-
tion results for quantum protocols achieving classical primitives with computational and
information-theoretic security. Interestingly, classical and quantum protocols seem to be sim-
ilarly powerful with respect to computational security whereas in the information-theoretic
setting, the two landscapes look different.
1.3 Roadmap
In Section 2, we introduce the cryptographic and information-theoretic notions and concepts
used throughout the paper. We define, motivate, and analyze the generality of modeling
two-party quantum protocols by embeddings in Section 3 and define triviality of primitives
and embeddings. In Section 4, we define the notion of leakage of embeddings, show basic
properties and argue that it is a reasonable measure of privacy. In Section 5, we explicitly
lower bound the leakage of some universal two-party primitives. Finally, in Section 6 we
discuss possible directions for future research and open questions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum Information Theory
For x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, δx,x = 1 and δx,y = 0 if x 6= y. In the following, we denote by U(A) the set
of unitary transforms acting in Hilbert space HA. Let |ψ〉AB ∈ HAB be an arbitrary pure
state of the joint systems A and B. The states of these subsystems are ρA = trB |ψ〉〈ψ| and
ρB = trA |ψ〉〈ψ|, respectively. We denote by S(A)ψ := S(ρA) and S(B)ψ := S(ρB) the von
Neumann entropy (defined as the Shannon entropy of the eigenvalues of the density matrix)
of subsystem A and B respectively. Whenever the quantum state |ψ〉 is clear from the
context, we omit the subscripts from entropic quantities and simply write S(A) and S(B).
Since the joint system is in a pure state, it follows from the Schmidt decomposition that
S(A) = S(B) (see e.g. [NC00]). Analogously to their classical counterparts, we can define
quantum conditional entropy S(A|B) := S(AB) − S(B), and quantum mutual information
S(A;B) := S(A)+S(B)−S(AB) = S(A)−S(A|B) = S(B)−S(B|A). Note that applying a
local unitary transform U = IA⊗UB to the bipartite state ρAB does not change the mutual
information S(A;B)ρ = S(A;B)UρU† , because the spectra of eigenvalues of ρA, ρB and ρAB
remain the same. Even though S(A|B) can be negative in general, S(A|B) ≥ 0 is always
true if A is a classical register.
Let R = {(PX(x), ρxR}x∈X be an ensemble of states ρxR with prior probability PX(x).
This defines a classical-quantum (cq) state ρXR where the average quantum state is ρR =∑
x∈X PX(x)ρ
x
R. The following lemma states that applying a separate unitary transform to
each ρxR does not change the entropies S(XR) and H(X), but it might change S(R).
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Lemma 2.1. Let ρXR =
∑
x∈X PX(x)ρ
x
R be a cq-state and let UXR =
∑
x |x〉〈x|X ⊗ UxR be
a unitary transform acting only on register R, conditioned on the classical value x in X.
Then, S(XR)ρXR = S(XR)UXRρXRU†XR
and H(X)ρXR = H(X)UXRρXRU†XR
.
Proof. The density matrix of the cq-state ρXR is block-diagonal and applying separate uni-
tary transforms UxR in every sub-block does not change the overall spectrum of eigenvalues.
Hence, the entropy S(XR) remains the same. The second equality follows from the fact that
the unitary UXR only acts on register R. ⊓⊔
The famous result by Holevo upper-bounds the amount of classical information about
X that can be obtained by measuring ρR:
Theorem 2.2 (Holevo bound [Hol73,Rus02]). Let Y be the random variable describ-
ing the outcome of some measurement applied to ρR for R = {PX(x), ρxR}x∈X . Then,
I(X ;Y ) ≤ S(ρR)−
∑
x PX(x)S(ρ
x
R), where equality can be achieved if and only if {ρxR}x∈X
are simultaneously diagonalizable.
Note that if all states in the ensemble are pure and all different then in order to achieve
equality in the theorem above, they have to form an orthonormal basis of the space they
span. In this case, the variable Y achieving equality is the measurement outcome in this
orthonormal basis.
2.2 Markov Chains
We say that three classical random variables X,Y, Z with joint distribution PXY Z form a
Markov chain X ↔ Y ↔ Z, if X and Z are independent given Y , i.e., PXZ|Y = PX|Y ·PZ|Y .
Equivalent conditions are PX|Y Z = PX|Y or PZ|Y X = PZ|Y [CT91]. Markov chains with
quantum ends have been defined in [DFSS07] and used in subsequent works such as [FS09].
For a ccq-state ρXYR =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρx,yR , we say that X , Y , R form a
Markov chain X ↔ Y ↔ R, if ρXYR =
∑
x,y PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y|⊗ ρyR, i.e., the quantum
register R depends only on the classical variable y but not on x.
Lemma 2.3. For a ccq-state ρXYR, the following conditions are equivalent:
1. X ↔ Y ↔ R
2. S(X |Y R) = S(X |Y )
3. S(R|Y X) = S(R|Y )
4. S(X ;Y R) = I(X ;Y ) .
Proof. For fixed x, y, we can diagonalize ρx,yR =
∑
k λ
x,y
k |ϕx,yk 〉〈ϕx,yk |R. By redefining the
random variable Y to be (Y K) with joint distribution PX(Y K)(x, yk) = PXY (x, y)λ
x,y
k , we
can assume without loss of generality that ρx,yR = |ϕx,y〉〈ϕx,y |R is a pure state for every fixed
x, y. In that case, it is easy to check that X ↔ Y ↔ R implies the other three conditions,
because S(XYR) = S(XY ) and S(Y R) = S(Y ).
On the other hand, if X ↔ Y ↔ R does not hold, there exist x 6= x′ and y such
that ρx,yR 6= ρx
′,y
R . Hence, there exists a measurement on registers Y R that reveals more
information about X than just knowing Y , which implies S(X |Y R) 6= S(X |Y ). The other
implications can be shown similarly. ⊓⊔
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2.3 Dependent Part
The following definition introduces a random variable describing the correlation between
two random variables X and Y , obtained by collapsing all values x1 and x2 for which Y has
the same conditional distribution, to a single value.
Definition 2.4 (Dependent part [WW04]). For two random variables X,Y , let fX(x) :=
PY |X=x. Then the dependent part of X with respect to Y is defined as X ց Y := fX(X).
The dependent part X ց Y is the minimum random variable among the random variables
computable from X for which X ↔ X ց Y ↔ Y forms a Markov chain [WW04]. In other
words, for any random variable K = f(X) such that X ↔ K ↔ Y is a Markov chain, there
exists a function g such that g(K) = X ց Y . Immediately from the definition we get several
other properties of X ց Y [WW04]: H(Y |X ց Y ) = H(Y |X), I(X ;Y ) = I(X ց Y ;Y ),
and X ց Y = X ց (Y ց X). The second and the third formula yield I(X ;Y ) = I(X ց
Y ;Y ց X). For two random variables X and Z, we write X ≡ Z if X and Z have the same
distributions (over possibly different alphabets). In particular, we write X ≡ X ց Y if the
random variable X consists only of the dependent part X ց Y with respect to Y .
The notion of dependent part has been further investigated in [FWW04,IMNW04,WW05a].
Wullschleger and Wolf have shown that quantities H(X ց Y |Y ) and H(Y ց X |X) are
monotones for two-party computation [WW05a]. That is, none of these values can in-
crease during classical two-party protocols. In particular, if Alice and Bob start a pro-
tocol from scratch then classical two-party protocols can only produce (X,Y ) such that:
H(X ց Y |Y ) = H(Y ց X |X) = 0, since H(X ց Y |Y ) > 0 if and only if H(Y ց X |X) >
0 [WW05a]. Conversely, any primitive satisfying H(X ց Y |Y ) = H(Y ց X |X) = 0 can
be implemented securely in the honest-but-curious (HBC) model. We call such primitives
trivial10.
2.4 Connected Components
Another property of a joint probability distribution PXY which we require is the notion of
connected components, as in [WW04, Def. 1].
Definition 2.5. Let X and Y be random variables with (disjoint) ranges X and Y, dis-
tributed according to PXY . Consider the bipartite graph G with vertex set X ∪ Y such that
two vertices x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are connected by an edge iff PXY (x, y) > 0 holds. We call
the edge sets C1, . . .Cℓ of connected components of the graph G the connected components
of PXY .
In this way, the joint distribution PXY can be split into ℓ distributions {PXj ,Yj}ℓj=1.
For every j, PXj ,Yj is a distribution with a single component over alphabet Xj ×Yj , where
X is the disjoint union of the Xj and Y the disjoint union of the Yj . We denote by the
random variable C the component of XY , resulting in the joint distribution PCXY . Then,
PC(j) =
∑
xy∈Cj PXY (x, y) =
∑
x∈Xj PX(x) = Pr(X ∈ Xj) =
∑
y∈Yj PY (y) = Pr(Y ∈ Yj)
is the probability that XY ends up in component Cj (which is the same as the probability
that X ends up in Xj and that Y ends up in Yj). Note that C is a deterministic function of
X (and also of Y ), hence
I(X ;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) = H(Y C)−H(Y |XC) = H(C) +H(Y |C)−H(Y |XC)
= H(C) + I(X ;Y |C) . (2)
10 See Footnote 6 for a caveat about this terminology.
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2.5 Purification
All security questions we ask are with respect to (quantum) honest-but-curious adversaries.
In the classical honest-but-curious adversary model (HBC), the parties follow the instruc-
tions of a protocol but store all information available to them. Quantum honest-but-curious
adversaries (QHBC), on the other hand, are allowed to behave in an arbitrary way that
cannot be distinguished from their honest behavior by the other player.
Almost all impossibility results in quantum cryptography rely upon a quantum honest-
but-curious behavior of the adversary. This behavior consists in purifying all actions of
the honest players. Purifying means that instead of invoking classical randomness from a
random tape, for instance, the adversary relies upon quantum registers holding all random
bits needed. The operations to be executed from the random outcome are then performed
quantumly without fixing the random outcomes. For example, suppose a protocol instructs
a party to pick with probability p state |φ0〉C and with probability 1− p state |φ1〉C before
sending it to the other party through the quantum channel C. The purified version of this
instruction looks as follows: Prepare a quantum register in state
√
p|0〉R+
√
1− p|1〉R holding
the random process. Add a new register initially in state |0〉C before applying the unitary
transform U : |r〉R|0〉C 7→ |r〉R|φr〉C for r ∈ {0, 1}, send register C through the quantum
channel and keep register R.
¿From the receiver’s point of view, the purified behavior is indistinguishable from the
one relying upon a classical source of randomness because in both cases, the state of register
C is ρ = p|φ0〉〈φ0| + (1 − p)|φ1〉〈φ1|. All operations invoking classical randomness can be
purified similarly [LC97,May97,Lo97,Ken04]. The result is that measurements are postponed
as much as possible and only extract information required to run the protocol in the sense
that only when both players need to know a random outcome, the corresponding quantum
register holding the random coin will be measured. If both players purify their actions then
the joint state at any point during the execution will remain pure, until the very last step
of the protocol when the outcomes are measured.
2.6 Secure Two-Party Computation
In Section 5, we investigate the leakage of several universal cryptographic two-party primi-
tives. By universality we mean that any two-party secure function evaluation can be reduced
to them. We investigate the completely randomized versions where players do not have in-
puts but receive randomized outputs instead. Throughout this paper, the term primitive
usually refers to the joint probability distribution defining its randomized version. Any pro-
tocol implementing the standard version of a primitive (with inputs) can also be used to
implement a randomized version of the same primitive, with the “inputs” chosen according
to an arbitrary fixed probability distribution.
3 Two-Party Protocols and Their Embeddings
3.1 Strict Correctness
In this work, we consider cryptographic primitives providing X to honest player Alice and
Y to honest player Bob according to a joint probability distribution PX,Y . The goal of this
section is to define when a protocol π correctly implements the primitive PX,Y . The first
natural requirement is that once the actions of π are purified by both players, measurements
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of registers A and B in the computational basis11 provide joint outcome (X,Y ) = (x, y)
with probability PX,Y (x, y).
Protocol π can use extra registers A′ on Alice’s and B′ on Bob’s side providing them
with (quantum) working space. The purification of all actions of π therefore generates a pure
state |ψ〉 ∈ HAB⊗HA′B′ . A second requirement for the correctness of the protocol π is that
these extra registers are only used as working space, i.e. the final state |ψ〉ABA′B′ is such that
the content of Alice’s working register A′ does not give her any further information about
Bob’s output Y than what she can infer from her honest output X and vice versa for B′.
Formally, we require that S(XA′;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) and S(X ;Y B′) = I(X ;Y ). By Lemma 2.3,
the two conditions are equivalent to requiring A′ ↔ X ↔ Y ↔ B′ to be a Markov chain.
Definition 3.1. A protocol π for PX,Y is strictly correct if measuring registers A and B
of its final state in the computational basis yields outcomes X and Y with distribution PX,Y
and the final state satisfies S(X ;Y B′) = S(XA′;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) where A′ and B′ denote
the extra working registers of Alice and Bob. The state |ψ〉 ∈ HAB ⊗ HA′B′ is called an
embedding of PX,Y if it can be produced by the purification of a strictly correct protocol for
PX,Y .
We would like to point out that our definition of correctness is stronger than the usual
classical notion which only requires the correct distribution for the output of the honest
players. For example, the trivial classical protocol for the primitive PX,Y in which Alice
samples both player’s outputs XY , sends Y to Bob, but keeps a copy of Y for herself, is not
strictly correct because it implements a fundamentally different primitive, namely PXY,Y .
Definition 3.1 requires that any protocol for PX,Y leaks no information beyond I(X ;Y ) to
any party having measured its output X or Y .
3.2 Regular Embeddings
We call an embedding |ψ〉ABA′B′ regular if the working registers A′, B′ are empty. Formally,
let Θn,m := {θ : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → [0 . . . 2π)} be the set of functions mapping bit-strings
of length m+ n to real numbers between 0 and 2π.
Definition 3.2. For a joint probability distribution PX,Y where X ∈ {0, 1}n and Y ∈
{0, 1}m, we define the set
E(PX,Y ) :=
|ψ〉 ∈ HAB : |ψ〉 = ∑
x∈{0,1}n, y∈{0,1}m
eiθ(x,y)
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB , θ ∈ Θn,m
 ,
and call any state |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) a regular embedding of the joint probability distribution
PX,Y .
Clearly, any |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) produces (X,Y ) with distribution PX,Y since the probabil-
ity that Alice measures x and Bob measures y in the computational basis is |〈ψ|x, y〉|2 =
PX,Y (x, y). In order to specify a particular regular embedding one only needs to give the
11 It is clear that every quantum protocol for which the final measurement (providing (x, y) with
distribution PX,Y to the players) is not in the computational basis can be transformed into a
protocol of the described form by two additional local unitary transformations.
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description of the phase function θ(x, y). We denote by |ψθ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) the quantum embed-
ding of PX,Y with phase function θ. The constant function θ(x, y) := 0 for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, y ∈
{0, 1}m corresponds to what we call canonical embedding |ψ0〉 :=
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB.
In Lemma 4.3 below we show that every primitive PX,Y has a regular embedding which
is in some sense the most secure among all embeddings of PX,Y .
3.3 Trivial Classical Primitives and Trivial Embeddings
In this section, we define triviality of classical primitives and (bipartite) embeddings. We
show that for any non-trivial classical primitive, its canonical quantum embedding is also
non-trivial. Intuitively, a primitive PX,Y is trivial if X and Y can be generated by Alice and
Bob from scratch in the classical honest-but-curious (HBC) model12. Formally, we define
triviality via an entropic quantity based on the notion of dependent part (see Section 2).
Definition 3.3. A primitive PX,Y is called trivial if it satisfies H(X ց Y |Y ) = 0, or
equivalently, H(Y ց X |X) = 0. Otherwise, the primitive is called non-trivial.
Definition 3.4. A regular embedding |ψ〉AB ∈ E(PX,Y ) is called trivial if either S(X ց
Y |B) = 0 or S(Y ց X |A) = 0. Otherwise, we say that |ψ〉AB is non-trivial.
Notice that unlike in the classical case, S(X ց Y |B) = 0 ⇔ S(Y ց X |A) = 0 does not
hold in general. As an example, consider a shared quantum state where the computational
basis corresponds to the Schmidt basis for only one of its subsystems, say for A. Let |ψ〉 =
α|0〉A|ξ0〉B + β|1〉A|ξ1〉B be such that both subsystems are two-dimensional, {|ξ0〉, |ξ1〉} 6=
{|0〉, |1〉}, 〈ξ0|ξ1〉 = 0, and |〈ξ0|0〉| 6= |〈ξ1|0〉|. We then have S(X |B) = 0 and S(Y |A) > 0
while X ≡ X ց Y and Y ≡ Y ց X .
To illustrate this definition of triviality, we argue in the following that if a primitive
PX,Y has a trivial regular embedding, there exists a classical protocol which generates X,Y
securely in the HBC model. Let |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) be trivial and assume without loss of gener-
ality that S(Y ց X |A) = 0. Intuitively, this means that Alice can learn everything possible
about Bob’s outcome Y (Y could include some private coin-flips on Bob’s side, but that is
“filtered out” by the dependent part). More precisely, Alice holding register A can measure
her part of the shared state to completely learn a realization of Y ց X , specifying PX|Y=y.
She then chooses X according to the distribution PX|Y=y. An equivalent way of trivially
generating (X,Y ) classically is the following classical protocol:
1. Alice samples y′ from distribution PYցX and announces the outcome to Bob.
2. Alice samples x from distribution PX|YցX=y′ .
3. Bob samples y from distribution PY |YցX=y′ .
Of course, the same reasoning applies in case S(X ց Y |B) = 0 with the roles of Alice and
Bob reversed.
In fact, the following lemma shows that any non-trivial primitive PX,Y has a non-trivial
embedding, i.e. there exists a quantum protocol strict-correctly implementing PX,Y while
leaking less information to QHBC adversaries than any classical protocol for PX,Y in the
HBC model.
Lemma 3.5. If PX,Y is a non-trivial primitive then the canonical embedding |ψ0〉 ∈ E(PX,Y )
is also non-trivial.
12 See Footnote 6 for a caveat about this terminology.
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Proof. A non-trivial embedding of PX,Y can be created from a non-trivial embedding of
PXցY,YցX by applying local unitary transforms. We therefore assume without loss of gen-
erality that X ≡ X ց Y and Y ≡ Y ց X . Let
|ψ0〉 :=
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉
be the canonical embedding of PX,Y . Since X ≡ X ց Y and Y ≡ Y ց X , it holds for
any x0 6= x1 that PY |X=x0 6= PY |X=x1 . Furthermore, since PX,Y is non-trivial, there exist
x0 6= x1 and y0 such that PY |X=x0(y0) > 0 and PY |X=x1(y0) > 0. The state |ψ0〉 can be
written in the form:
|ψ0〉 =
√
PX(x0)|x0〉
∑
y
√
PY |X=x0(y)|y〉+
√
PX(x1)|x1〉
∑
y
√
PY |X=x1(y)|y〉+ |ψ′〉 ,
where tr(|x0〉〈x0| trB |ψ′〉〈ψ′|) = tr(|x1〉〈x1| trB |ψ′〉〈ψ′|) = 0. Set |ϕxb〉 :=
∑
y
√
PY |X=xb(y)|y〉
for b ∈ {0, 1}. Since PY |X=x0 6= PY |X=x1 , we get that |〈ϕx0 |ϕx1〉| < 1. Because all coeffi-
cients at |y〉 in the normalized vectors |ϕx0〉 and |ϕx1〉 are non-negative, and the coefficients
at |y0〉 are both positive, 〈ϕx0 |ϕx1〉 6= 0. Therefore, the non-identical states |ϕx0〉 and |ϕx1〉
cannot be perfectly distinguished, which implies that Bob cannot learn whether X = x0 or
X = x1 with probability 1. Therefore, the von Neumann entropy on Bob’s side S(B) is such
that S(B) < H(X). As shown in [WW05a], H(X ց Y |Y ) > 0 implies H(Y ց X |X) > 0,
and we can argue in the same way as above that S(A) < H(Y ) from which follows that |ψ0〉
is a non-trivial quantum embedding of PX,Y . ⊓⊔
4 The Leakage of Quantum Embeddings
In this section, we formally define the leakage of embeddings and establish properties of the
leakage.
4.1 Definition and Basic Properties of Leakage
A perfect implementation of PX,Y simply provides X to Alice and Y to Bob and does
nothing else. The expected amount of information that one random variable gives about the
other is I(X ;Y ) = H(X) −H(X |Y ) = H(Y ) − H(Y |X) = I(Y ;X). Intuitively, we define
the leakage of a quantum embedding |ψ〉ABA′B′ of PX,Y as the larger of the two following
quantities: the extra amount of information Bob’s quantum registers BB′ provide about
X and the extra amount Alice’s quantum state in AA′ provides about Y respectively in
comparison to “the minimum amount” I(X ;Y ).13
Definition 4.1. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ be an embedding of PX,Y . We define the leakage |ψ〉 as
∆ψ(PX,Y ) := max {S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) , S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y )} .
Furthermore, we say that |ψ〉 is δ-leaking if ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ δ .
13 There are other natural candidates for the notion of leakage such as the difference in difficulty
between guessing Alice’s output X by measuring Bob’s final quantum state B and based on the
output of the ideal functionality Y . While such definitions do make sense, they turn out not to
be as easy to work with and it is an open question whether the natural properties described later
in this section can be established for these notions of leakage as well.
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It is easy to see that the leakage is non-negative since S(X ;BB′) ≥ S(X ; B˜) for B˜ the
result of a quantum operation applied to BB′. Such an operation could be the trace over
the extra working register B′ and a measurement in the computational basis of each qubit
of the part encoding Y , yielding S(X ; B˜) = I(X ;Y ).
We want to argue that our notion of leakage is a good measure for the privacy of the
player’s outputs. In the same spirit, we will argue that the minimum achievable leakage for
a primitive is related to the “hardness” of implementing it. We start off by proving several
basic properties about leakage.
For a general state in HABA′B′ the quantities S(X ;BB′) − I(X ;Y ) and S(AA′;Y ) −
I(X ;Y ) are not necessarily equal. Note though that they coincide for regular embeddings
|ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) produced by a strictly correct protocol (where the work spaces A′ and B′ are
empty): Notice that S(X ;B) = S(X)+S(B)−S(X,B) = H(X)+S(B)−H(X) = S(B) and
because |ψ〉 is pure, S(A) = S(B). Therefore, S(X ;B) = S(A;Y ) and the two quantities
coincide. The following lemma states that this actually happens for all embeddings and
hence, the definition of leakage is symmetric with respect to both players.
Lemma 4.2 (Symmetry). Let |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ be an embedding of PX,Y . Then,
∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(X ;BB
′)− I(X ;Y ) = S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y ) .
Proof. We have already shown that the statement is true in the case where both A′ and B′
are trivial. In the case where A′ is trivial and B′ is not, the Markov chain condition implies
that |ψ〉 is of the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB |ϕy〉B′ ,
hence, Bob can fix y0 and apply a unitary transform UBB′ on his part of the system, such
that UBB′ |y, ϕy〉 = |y, ϕy0〉, and
IA ⊗ UBB′ |ψ〉ABB′ = |ψ∗〉AB ⊗ |ϕy0〉B′ ,
where |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). Note that the unitary transform UBB′ does not change the entropic
quantity S(X ;BB′)|ψ〉 = S(X ;BB′)UBB′ |ψ〉. Hence, in the resulting product state, we have
that S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) = S(X ;B)− I(X ;Y ) = S(A;Y )− I(X ;Y ), due to the fact that
|ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). An analogous statement holds in the case where B′ is trivial and A′ is
non-trivial.
We now assume that both A′ and B′ are non-trivial. An embedding of PX,Y can be
written as
|ψ〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB|ϕx,y〉A′B′
=
∑
j
√
PC(j)
∑
x∈Xj,y∈Yj
√
PX,Y |C=j(x, y)|x, y〉AB |ϕx,y〉A′B′
=
∑
j
√
PC(j)|ψj〉ABA′B′ ,
where C denotes the connected component of X,Y (see Section 2.4) and where for any j,
|ψj〉 is an embedding of the single-component primitive PXj ,Yj .
13
We want to show that
S(X ;BB′)ψ − I(X ;Y ) = S(AA′;Y )ψ − I(X ;Y ) . (3)
Using the reasoning of Equation (2) for the three terms S(X ;BB′), I(X ;Y ), S(AA′;Y ),
Equation (3) is equivalent to14
S(X ;BB′|C)ψ − I(X ;Y |C) = S(AA′;Y |C)ψ − I(X ;Y |C)
and hence, it suffices to show symmetry for all single-component primitives PXj ,Yj and their
embeddings |ψj〉. For the rest of the proof, we drop the index j for the ease of notation.
Note that S(X ;BB′) = H(X)+S(BB′)−S(XBB′) and S(AA′;Y ) = H(Y )+S(AA′)−
S(AA′Y ). As |ψ〉 is a pure state, we have that S(AA′)ψ = S(BB′)ψ, and it suffices to show
that
H(X)− S(XBB′)ψ = H(Y )− S(AY A′)ψ . (4)
For every x and y, we can write the bipartite pure state
|ϕx,y〉A′B′ =
K∑
k=1
√
λx,yk |ex,yk 〉A′ |fx,yk 〉B′
in Schmidt form. For the reduced density matrices, we obtain
ρx,yA′ =
∑
k
λx,yk |ex,yk 〉〈ex,yk | .
Since any embedding |ψ〉 ∈ HABA′B′ of PX,Y is produced by a strictly correct protocol,
it satisfies
S(XA′;Y ) = S(X ;Y B′) = I(X ;Y )
which is equivalent by Lemma 2.3 to A′ ↔ X ↔ Y and X ↔ Y ↔ B′ being Markov chains.
It follows that for every x and y 6= y′ in the same connected component of PXY , the reduced
density matrices ρx,yA′ = ρ
x,y′
A′ = ρ
x
A′ coincide and therefore, the eigenvalues λ
x,y
k cannot
depend on y. Because of X ↔ Y ↔ B′, they can neither depend on x. Hence, |ϕx,y〉 =∑
k
√
λke
iθ′(k,x,y)|ex,yk 〉|fx,yk 〉.15 The phase factors arise from the fact that from a reduced
density matrix the global phases of the Schmidt-basis elements cannot be determined.
Let us fix a set of orthogonal states {|k〉}k. We define the unitary transformation
UABA′B′ to map the orthonormal states {|ex,yk 〉A′}k into the orthonormal states {|k〉A′}k,
and {|fx,yk 〉B′}k into {|k〉B′}k. Note that UABA′B′ only acts on registers A′B′ conditioned
14 The only step that needs some extra thought is the following: S(X|BB′) = S(X|BB′C) holds,
because the component C can be determined with certainty by measuring register B with pro-
jectors {∑y∈Yj |y〉〈y|B}j .
15 We note that it is only possible to draw this conclusion within the same connected component.
The eigenvalues λx,yk and λ
x′,y′
k for x, y and x
′, y′ not in the same connected component of PXY
cannot be related to each other.
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on the x-value in A and the y-value in B. Applying UABA′B′ to |ψ〉 results into state
|χ〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB
∑
k
√
λke
iθ′(k,x,y)|k, k〉A′B′
=
∑
k
√
λk
(∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)e
iθ′(k,x,y)|x, y〉
)
|k, k〉
=
∑
k
√
λk|χk〉AB ⊗ |k, k〉A′B′ ,
where each |χk〉AB ∈ E(PX,Y ). The cqq-state σXBB′ can now be written in the form:
σXBB′ =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗
∑
k
λk|γxk , k〉〈γxk , k| ,
where |γxk 〉 =
∑
y
√
PY |X=xeiθ
′(k,x,y)|y〉. Due to the second register, the states |γxk , k〉 are
mutually orthogonal for each x. Therefore, for each x,
S
(∑
k
λk|γxk , k〉〈γxk , k|
)
= H(λ1, . . . , λK) .
As a result we get that
S(XBB′)χ = H(X) +
∑
x
PX(x)H(λ1, . . . , λK) = H(X) +H(λ1, . . . , λK)
and analogously,
S(AA′Y )χ = H(Y ) +H(λ1, . . . , λK) .
Equation (4) now follows by applying Lemma 2.1 in the first and last step of the following
equations.
H(X)− S(XBB′)ψ = H(X)− S(XBB′)χ
= −H(λ1, . . . , λK)
= H(Y )− S(AY A′)χ
= H(Y )− S(AY A′)ψ .
⊓⊔
If a primitive PX,Y has multiple connected components and |ψj〉 are (not necessarily
regular) embeddings of PXj ,Yj , then the state |ψ〉 :=
∑
j
√
PC(j)|ψj〉 is an embedding of
PX,Y with leakage
∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(X ;BB
′)ψ − I(X ;Y ) = S(X ;BB′|C)ψ − I(X ;Y |C)
=
∑
j
PC(j)∆ψj (PXj ,Yj ) ,
(5)
by the same reasoning as in the previous proof (along the lines of Equation (2)). Any party
can determine the active component without disturbing the state once the other party
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got his/her output (see Footnote 14). Therefore, measuring the component C can be done
without changing the amount of information the state contains about the other party’s
output. Hence, we can always assume that the parties know the current component in use.
The next lemma shows that the leakage of an embedding for a given primitive is always
lower-bounded by the leakage of some regular embedding of the same primitive, which
simplifies the calculation of lower bounds for the leakage of embeddings.
Lemma 4.3. For every embedding |ψ〉 of a primitive PX,Y , there exists |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y )
such that ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ ∆ψ∗(PX,Y ).
Proof. In the case where A′ and B′ are both trivial, then |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) is a regular em-
bedding and the statement holds trivially. In the case where A′ is trivial and B′ is not, we
have shown at the beginning of the proof of Lemma 4.2 that an embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y is
locally equivalent to a state |ψ′〉AB ⊗ |σ〉B′ for |ψ′〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) and a pure state |σ〉B′ . An
analogous statement holds if B′ is trivial and A′ is not. Therefore, in these two cases we get
for some |ψ′〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) that ∆ψ(PX,Y ) = ∆ψ′(PX,Y ).
Now assume that both A′ and B′ are non-trivial and that PX,Y has multiple connected
components. As in the proof of Lemma 4.2, the state |ψ〉ABA′B′ can be written as
|ψ〉ABA′B′ =
∑
j
√
PC(j)|ψj〉ABA′B′ ,
where |ψj〉 is an embedding of PXj ,Yj , the primitive corresponding to the jth connected
component of PX,Y . Let us assume for now that the lemma holds for single-component
primitives. In that case, we get for every j and embedding |ψj〉 a regular embedding |ψ∗j 〉 ∈
E(PXj ,Yj ) such that ∆ψj (PXj ,Yj ) ≥ ∆ψ∗j (PXj ,Yj ). We define |ψ∗〉 =
∑
j
√
PC(j)|ψ∗j 〉 and
conclude that
∆ψ(PX,Y ) =
∑
j
PC(j)∆ψj (PX,Y ) ≥
∑
j
PC(j)∆ψ∗j (PX,Y ) = ∆ψ∗(PX,Y ) ,
where the equalities are due to Equation (5).
It remains to show the lemma for single-component primitives PX,Y . The state |ψ〉ABA′B′
is of the form established in the proof of Lemma 4.2:
|ψ〉ABA′B′ =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB ⊗
∑
k
√
λke
iθ(k,x,y)|ex,yk 〉A′ |fx,yk 〉B′ . (6)
Let λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λt) be an ordering of all eigenvalues {λk}k each repeated as many
times as their multiplicity. Let Fx,y = {fx,yk }k be the set of eigenvectors in B′ for each pair
(x, y). Since X ↔ Y ↔ B′ is a Markov chain, the eigenvectors fx,yk can be chosen such that
Fx,y = Fx′,y =: Fy for any x, x
′, y in the same connected component. Let us fix an ordering
of the elements of Fy, 〈Fy〉 = 〈fy1 , fy2 , . . . , fyt 〉, such that eigenvector fyh has eigenvalue λh
whenever y ∈ Y. 16
16 The Markov chain condition guarantees that a single ordering 〈Fy〉 suffices in the following sense:
two eigenvectors fx,yk ∈ Fx,y and fx
′,y
k′ ∈ Fx′,y such that fx,yk = fx
′,y
k′ = f
y
h for some f
y
h ∈ Fy
necessarily have the same eigenvalue λh.
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Consider the (incomplete) projective measurement M = {Qh}h with measurement op-
erators
Qh =
∑
y∈Y
|y〉〈y|B ⊗ |fyh 〉〈fyh |B′ .
Now, suppose thatM is applied to registers BB′ of |ψ〉ABA′B′ . It is easy to verify that with
probability λh, outcome h will be obtained and the state will collapse to:
|ψh〉ABA′B′ =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB ⊗ eiθ(k(h,x,y),x,y)
∣∣∣ex,yk(h,x,y)〉
A′
⊗ |fyh 〉B′ ,
where k(h, x, y) is the index such that |ex,yk(h,x,y)〉 is associated with |fyh 〉 in the Schmidt
decomposition (6) when X = x and Y = y. Notice that |ψh〉 is an embedding of PX,Y . Let
Uh ∈ U(BB′) be the local unitary transform on BB′ defined as:
Uh|y〉B|fyh〉B′ = |y〉B|0〉B′ ,
and let |ψ̂h〉 = (IAA′ ⊗ Uh)|ψh〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)|x, y〉AB ⊗ eiθ(k,x,y)|ex,yk 〉A′ |0〉B′ be an
embedding of PX,Y locally equivalent to |ψh〉 but with a trivial register B′.
Let us put things together:
S(X ;BB′)ψ ≥ S(X ;BB′)∑
h λh|ψh〉〈ψh| (7)
=
∑
h
λhS(X ;BB
′)ψh
≥ min
h
S(X ;BB′)ψh
= S(X ;BB′)ψ̂h∗ , (8)
where (7) follows from the fact that the local measurement M does not increase mutual
information [NC00, Theorem 11.15(3)], and (8) follows since |ψ̂h〉 is locally equivalent to
|ψh〉 for all h. Since |ψ̂h∗〉 is an embedding of PX,Y with register B′ being trivial, we can
use the reasoning from the beginning of the proof that |ψ̂h∗〉 is locally equivalent to a state
|ψ∗〉AB ⊗ |σ〉B′ with |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). By Lemma 4.2, the same proof applies to S(Y ;AA′)ψ .
⊓⊔
So far, we have defined the leakage of an embedding of a primitive. We now define the
leakage of a primitive the natural way:
Definition 4.4. We define the leakage of a primitive PX,Y as the minimal leakage among
all protocols strict-correctly implementing PX,Y . Formally,
∆PX,Y := min|ψ〉
∆ψ(PX,Y ) ,
where the minimization is over all embeddings |ψ〉 of PX,Y .
Notice that the minimum in the previous definition is well-defined, because by Lemma 4.3, it
is sufficient to minimize over regular embeddings |ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ). Furthermore, the function
∆ψ(PX,Y ) is continuous on the compact (i.e. closed and bounded) set [0, 2π]
|X×Y| of complex
phases corresponding to elements |x, y〉AB in the formula for |ψ〉AB ∈ E(PX,Y ) and therefore
it achieves its minimum.
The following theorem shows that the leakage of any embedding of a primitive PX,Y is
lower-bounded by the minimal leakage achievable for primitive PXցY,YցX (which due to
Lemma 4.3 is achieved by a regular embedding).
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Theorem 4.5. For any primitive PX,Y , ∆PX,Y ≥ ∆PXցY,YցX .
Proof. In fact, the random variables X ց Y and Y ց X in the claim can be replaced by
any variablesX ′ and Y ′ with the property that X ↔ X ′ ↔ Y and X ↔ Y ′ ↔ Y are Markov
chains, and that Y ′ = fY (Y ) and X ′ = fX(X) for some deterministic functions fY and fX .
For such random variables we then have I(X ′;Y ′) = I(X ;Y ). Therefore, showing that for
|ψ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ) with the lowest leakage among all regular embeddings of PX,Y (regularity
follows from Lemma 4.3) and for some |ψ∗〉 ∈ E(PX′,Y ′) , it holds that
S(A)ψ − I(X ;Y ) = ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ ∆ψ∗(PX′,Y ′) = S(A)ψ∗ − I(X ′;Y ′)
is equivalent to proving S(A)ψ ≥ S(A)ψ∗. First, we show that there exists |ψ˜〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′)
such that S(A)ψ ≥ S(A)ψ˜, i.e. ∆ψ(PX,Y ) ≥ ∆ψ˜(PX,Y ′). The existence of |ψ∗〉 such that
∆ψ˜(PX,Y ′) ≥ ∆ψ∗(PX′,Y ′) follows from an analogous argument.
State |ψ〉 can be written in the form:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)e
iθ(x,y)|x, y〉AB .
For any realization y′ of Y ′, let Oy′ be the set of elements y which are mapped to
y′ under fY (·), i.e. Oy′ := {y : fY (y) = y′}. Let g denote the bijection mapping tuples
(y′, jy) ∈ Y ′ ×Oy′ back to y. There exists an isometry U on Bob’s side such that
(IA ⊗ U)|ψ〉AB =
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y (x, y)e
iθ(x,y)|x, fY (y)jy〉AB˜B˜⊥
=
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉AB˜
∑
j∈Oy′
√
PY |Y ′=y′
(
g(y′, j)
)
eiθ(x,g(y
′,j))|j〉B˜⊥ , (9)
where HB˜B˜⊥ ∼= HB.
Our goal for the rest of the proof is to transform the register containing j into a form
where the order of the summations over (x, y′) and j in (9) can be reversed to get a state
of the form
|ϕ〉 = 1√
t
t∑
j=1
∣∣∣ψˆj〉
AB˜
|j〉B′ , (10)
where t is some normalization factor and each |ψˆj〉 is in E(PX,Y ′). Due to concavity of the
von Neumann entropy, we can then argue that
1
t
∑
j
S
(
trB˜B′
∣∣∣ψˆj〉〈ψˆj∣∣∣) ≤ S
1
t
∑
j
trB˜B′
∣∣∣ψˆj〉〈ψˆj∣∣∣
 = S (trB˜B′ |ϕ〉〈ϕ|) = S(A)ϕ . (11)
Hence, there exists a j such that |ψ˜j〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′) and S(A)ψ˜j ≤ S(A)ϕ = S(A)ψ , proving
the claim.
Let us fix δ > 0 and we show the existence of an embedding |ψ˜j〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′) such
that S(A)ψ˜j ≤ S(A)ψ + δ. In order to reverse the order of summation in (9), we show the
existence of an isometry W on Bob’s system such that
|ϕˆ〉 := (IA ⊗W )(IA ⊗ U)|ψ〉AB =
1√
t
t∑
z=1
∣∣∣ψˆz〉
AB˜
|z〉B′ ,
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where each |ψˆz〉 is a quantum embedding of a primitive PXˆ,Yˆ that is ε-close (in statistical
distance) to the primitive PX,Y ′ .
The idea is for a given y′ and j ∈ Oy′ to “slice up” the term |j〉B˜⊥ with weight√
PY |Y ′=y′
(
g(y′, j)
)
into a lot of very small pieces of weight 1/
√
t by letting W map |j〉B˜⊥
into superpositions
∑
z |z〉B′ , where t ∈ N is a large natural number to be determined later
as a function of δ. More formally, let us fix y′ and denote the elements of the set Oy′ as
{1, 2, . . . , k}. As a shorthand, we use pj := PY |Y ′=y′(g(y′, j)) and note that
∑k
j=1 pj = 1. We
define nj := ⌈t · pj⌋ to be the natural number of pieces required to approximate pj ≈ njt for
large t. Let t0 := 0 and tj :=
∑
i≤j ni. Then, we defineW to map |j〉B˜⊥ to 1√nj
∑tj
z=tj−1+1
|z〉
and get
|ϕˆ〉 = (IA ⊗W )
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉AB˜
∑
j∈Oy′
√
pje
iθ(x,g(y′,j))|j〉B˜⊥
=
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉AB˜
∑
j∈Oy′
√
pj
nj
eiθ(x,g(y
′,j))
tj∑
z=tj−1+1
|z〉 ,
It is not hard to verify [Sot08] that
pj
nj
can be written as 1t+
ε(y′,z)
t2 where the error |ε(y′, z)| ≤
c is upper bounded by a constant c independent of t. Then, we get
|ϕˆ〉 =
∑
x,y′
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉AB˜
t∑
z=1
√
1
t
+
ε(y′, z)
t2
eiθ
′(x,y′,z)|z〉B′
=
1√
t
t∑
z=1
∑
x,y′
eiθ
′(x,y′,z)
√
1 +
ε(y′, z)
t
√
PX,Y ′(x, y′)|x, y′〉AB˜
 |z〉B′
=
1√
t
t∑
z=1
∣∣∣ψˆz〉
AB˜
|z〉B′ ,
where θ′(x, y′, z) = θ(x, y) for y corresponding to (y′, z). Using the reasoning from (11),
we derive the existence of a z, such that the state |ψˆz〉 ∈ E(PXˆ,Yˆ ) is a regular embed-
ding of a primitive PXˆ,Yˆ that is ε(t)-close to PX,Y ′ and ε(t) → 0 when t → ∞. Fur-
thermore, we have that S(A)ψˆz ≤ S(A)ψ . As |ψˆz〉 is a regular embedding, we can write
|ψˆz〉 =
∑
xˆ,yˆ
√
PXˆ,Yˆ (xˆ, yˆ)e
iθˆ(xˆ,yˆ)|x〉|y〉 for some phase function θˆ(xˆ, yˆ). We define the de-
sired state |ψ˜〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ′) as |ψ˜〉 :=
∑
x,y
√
PX,Y ′(x, y)e
iθˆ(x,y)|x〉|y〉. We can choose t large
enough such that the distance
∥∥∥|ψˆz〉 − |ψ˜〉∥∥∥ is arbitrarily small and hence, by the conti-
nuity of the von Neumann entropy, also their entropies S(A) differ by at most δ. Hence,
S(A)ψ˜ ≤ S(A)ψˆz + δ ≤ S(A)ψ + δ, which is what we wanted to show. ⊓⊔
4.2 Leakage as Measure of Privacy and Hardness of Implementation
The main results of this section are consequences of the Holevo bound (Theorem 2.2).
Theorem 4.6. If a two-party strictly correct quantum protocol for PX,Y does not leak then
PX,Y is a trivial primitive.
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Proof. Theorem 4.5 implies that if there is a 0–leaking embedding of PX,Y then there is also
a 0–leaking embedding of PXցY,YցX . Let us therefore assume that |ψ〉 is a non-leaking
embedding of PX,Y such that X ≡ X ց Y and Y ≡ Y ց X . We can write |ψ〉 in the
form |ψ〉 = ∑x√PX(x)|x〉|ϕx〉 and get ρB = ∑x PX(x)|ϕx〉〈ϕx|. For the leakage of |ψ〉
we have: ∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(X ;B)− I(X ;Y ) = S(ρB)− I(X ;Y ) = 0. From the Holevo bound
(Theorem 2.2) follows that the states {|ϕx〉}x form an orthonormal basis of their span (since
X ≡ X ց Y , they are all different) and that Y captures the result of a measurement in
this basis, which therefore is the computational basis. Since Y ≡ Y ց X , we get that for
each x, there is a single yx ∈ Y such that |ϕx〉 = |yx〉. Primitives PXցY,YցX and PX,Y are
therefore trivial. ⊓⊔
In other words, the only primitives that two-party quantum protocols can implement
strict-correctly (without the help of a trusted third party) without leakage are the trivial
ones! We note also that strict correctness is not required for Theorem 4.6 to be true. A
slightly more involved proof can be done solely based on the correct distribution of the output
values. This result can be seen as a quantum extension of the corresponding characterization
for the cryptographic power of classical protocols in the HBC model. Whereas classical two-
party protocols cannot achieve anything non-trivial, their quantum counterparts necessarily
leak information when they implement non-trivial primitives.
4.3 Tripartite Embeddings
In this section, we extend the notion of leakage to protocols involving a trusted third party.
A special case of such protocols are the ones where the players are allowed one call to a
black box who provides them with classical variables X˜, Y˜ sampled according to distribution
PX˜,Y˜ . It is natural to ask which primitives PX,Y can be implemented without leakage in
this case.
The state produced by purifying Alice’s and Bob’s actions in such a protocol up to the
final measurement yielding X and Y can without loss of generality be viewed as a pure state
shared among Alice, Bob and an environment |ψ〉EABA′B′ =
∑
e
√
PE(e)|e〉E⊗|ψe〉ABA′B′ .
We define tripartite embeddings of a primitive PX,Y analogously to the case of embeddings:
Definition 4.7. A state |ψ〉 = ∑e PE(e)|e〉E ⊗ |ψe〉ABA′B′ is a tripartite embedding of
PX,Y , if measuring registers A and B in the computational basis yields X,Y with distribution
PX,Y and the ensemble ρABA′B′ := trE |ψ〉〈ψ| satisfies S(X ;Y B′) = S(XA′;Y ) = I(X ;Y ) .
The generalization of the notion of leakage to tripartite embeddings is straightforward:
Definition 4.8. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HE ⊗HABA′B′ be a tripartite embedding of PX,Y . We define the
leakage of ρABA′B′ := trE |ψ〉〈ψ| viewed as an implementation of PX,Y as
∆ρABA′B′ (PX,Y ) := max {S(X ;BB′)− I(X ;Y ) , S(AA′;Y )− I(X ;Y )} .
The leakage of a tripartite embedding is non-negative, for the same reason as in the
bipartite case. However, it is not necessarily symmetric, for instance for the state |ψ〉EAB =√
1/3 (|001〉+ |110〉+ |111〉) which can be verified numerically.
The following theorem shows that non-leaking embeddings of any given primitive have
the property that Bob’s register B˜ holding his dependent part Y ց X has to be classical if
Alice honestly measures her register A in the computational basis to obtainX . An analogous
statement holds with the roles of Alice and Bob exchanged. Intuitively, this means that Bob
cannot learn more than Y ց X about Alice’s outcome X from a non-leaking embedding.
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Theorem 4.9. Let |ψ〉 ∈ HE ⊗HABA′B′ be a non-leaking tripartite embedding of primitive
PX,Y , where HA = HA˜ ⊗HA˜⊥ and HB = HB˜ ⊗HB˜⊥ . Then, there exist unitary transforms
U ∈ U(A) and V ∈ U(B) such that the state |ψU,V 〉 = (U ⊗ IA′ ⊗ V ⊗ IB′)|ψ〉 has the
following property. Let ρ˜XB˜B˜⊥B′ and ρ˜A˜Y A˜⊥A′ be the states obtained when register A of
trEA′(|ψU,V 〉〈ψU,V |) is measured in the computational basis to obtain X, and register B of
trEB′(|ψU,V 〉〈ψU,V |) is measured in the computational basis to obtain Y . It then holds that
ρ˜XB˜B˜⊥B′ =
∑
x,y˜
PX,YցX(x, y˜)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y˜〉〈y˜|B˜ ⊗ σy˜B˜⊥B′
and
ρ˜A˜Y A˜⊥A′ =
∑
x˜,y
PXցY,Y (x˜, y) |x˜〉〈x˜|A˜ ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ τ x˜A˜⊥A′ ,
for some set of density matrices {σy˜}y˜ in HB˜⊥B′ and {τ x˜}x˜ in HA˜⊥A′ .
Proof. Let |ψ〉EABA′B′ be a tripartite embedding of PX,Y :
|ψ〉 =
∑
e,x,y,i,j
√
PE,X,Y,I,J(e, x, y, i, j)e
iθ(e,x,y,i,j)|e, x, y, i, j〉EABA′B′ .
Let U and V be unitary transforms acting in HA and HB respectively and extracting each
party’s dependent part (X ց Y and Y ց X respectively) in subregisters A˜ ⊆ A and B˜ ⊆ B
respectively:
U |x〉A = |f(x)〉A˜ ⊗ |µx〉A˜⊥ and V |y〉B = |g(y)〉B˜ ⊗ |νy〉B˜⊥ ,
for classical functions f and g providing the dependent parts X ց Y and Y ց X associated
to X and Y respectively. For U and V to be unitary, we have that 〈µx|µx′〉 = 0 for all x 6= x′
such that f(x) = f(x′), and that 〈νy|νy′〉 = 0 for all y 6= y′ such that g(y) = g(y′). We
define∣∣∣ψ˜〉 = (IE ⊗ U ⊗ IA′ ⊗ V ⊗ IB′)|ψ〉
=
∑
e,x,y,i,j
√
PE,X,Y,I,J(e, x, y, i, j)e
iθ(e,x,y,i,j)|e, f(x), g(y)〉A˜B˜⊗
|µx〉A˜⊥ |νy〉B˜⊥ |i, j〉A′B′ ,
where HA˜A˜⊥ ∼= HA and HB˜B˜⊥ ∼= HB . Re-writing |ψ˜〉 in terms of the different values which
X may take results in:∣∣∣ψ˜〉 =∑
x
√
PX(x)|x〉A ⊗
∑
e,i
√
PE,I|X=x(e, i)|e, i〉EA′ |ϕe,x,i〉BB′
=:
∑
x
√
PX(x)|x〉A ⊗ |ζx〉A′EB˜B˜⊥B′ .
We can view the information provided to Bob about X as the information available about
X when encoded by x 7→ ρx where:
ρx = trA′E (|ζx〉〈ζx|) =
∑
e,i
PE,I|X=x(e, i)|ϕe,i〉〈ϕe,i|BB′ .
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By basic properties of the von Neumann entropy, we have that
S(X ;BB′)ψ = S(X ;BB′)ψ˜
= S(X ; B˜B˜⊥B′)ψ˜
≥ S(X ;Y ց XB˜⊥B′)ψ˜
≥ I(X ;Y ց X) .
Suppose now that |ψ〉 is non-leaking, that is S(X ;BB′) = I(X ;Y ) = I(X ;Y ց X). It
follows that for non-leaking embeddings, all terms above are actually equal.
By the Holevo bound (Theorem 2.2), we conclude that states in {ρx}x are simultaneously
diagonalizable. In other words, for all x,
ρx =
∑
z
PZ|X=x(z)|γz〉〈γz|BB′ ,
where {|γz〉}z form an orthonormal basis for some subspace ofHB˜B˜⊥B′ . Since S(X ;BB′)ψ˜ =
S(X ;Y ց XB˜⊥B′)ψ˜, we conclude that such a basis can be chosen to be the computational
basis for the register B˜ holding Y ց X :
ρ˜XB˜B˜⊥B′ =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ ρx
=
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗
∑
z
PZ|X=x(z) |γz〉〈γz|BB′
=
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗
∑
y˜
PYցX|X=x(y˜) |y˜〉〈y˜|B˜ ⊗ σy˜,xB˜⊥B′
=
∑
x,y˜
PX,YցX(x, y˜)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y˜〉〈y˜|B˜ ⊗ σy˜,xB˜⊥B′ .
We now observe that |ψ〉 being non-leaking implies that σy˜,x
B˜⊥B′
cannot depend on x. Other-
wise, suppose that for some y˜ there exist x 6= x′ such that σy˜,x
B˜⊥B′
6= σy˜,x′
B˜⊥B′
with PX,YցX(x, y˜) >
0 and PX,YցX(x′, y˜) > 0. After having measured y˜, Bob can apply an optimal measurement
for distinguishing between σy˜,x
B˜⊥B′
and σy˜,x
′
B˜⊥B′
with some strictly positive bias allowing him
to get more information than I(X ;Y ց X) thereby implying that |ψ〉 is leaking. It follows
that
ρ˜XB˜B˜⊥B′ =
∑
x,y˜
PX,YցX(x, y˜)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |y˜〉〈y˜|B˜ ⊗ σy˜B˜⊥B′ .
The same argument symmetrically applied to ρA˜Y A˜⊥A′ leads to
ρ˜A˜Y A˜⊥A′ =
∑
x˜,y
PXցY,Y (x˜, y) |x˜〉〈x˜|A˜ ⊗ |y〉〈y|Y ⊗ τxA˜⊥A′ .
⊓⊔
For the remainder of this section, we focus on primitives PX,Y where each variable is
equivalent to its dependent part: X ≡ X ց Y and Y ≡ Y ց X . For non-leaking tripartite
embeddings of these primitives, we establish lower bounds on the conditional von Neumann
entropy of the environment given each party’s quantum states.
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In order to define what we mean by the entropy of the environment, we decompose any
tripartite embedding |ψ〉 of PX,Y in its Schmidt form with respect to the environment:
|ψ〉EABA′B′ =
∑
w
√
λw|ew〉E ⊗ |ψw〉ABA′B′ ,
where 〈ew|ew′〉 = 〈ψw |ψw′〉 = δw,w′ . Now, imagine the environment measures register E
in the Schmidt basis {|ew〉〈ew|}w to get classical random outcome W such that Pr[W =
w] = λw. Corollary 4.10 below shows that non-leaking tripartite embeddings of PX,Y must
satisfy S(W |AA′) ≥ H(Y |X) and S(W |BB′) ≥ H(X |Y ). If the Schmidt decomposition
is not unique, the result holds for a measurement in any Schmidt basis. Measurements in
the Schmidt basis minimize the entropy of the outcome among any complete Von Neumann
measurement applied to the state of the environment. Intuitively, S(W |AA′) measures the
amount of shared entanglement between Alice and the environment (similarly, S(W |BB′)
is a measure for the shared entanglement between Bob and the environment). The more
non-trivial a primitive gets, the more the environment has to be entangled with the players
in order to preserve privacy.
Corollary 4.10. Let |ψ〉EABA′B′ be any non-leaking tripartite embedding of PX,Y where
X ≡ X ց Y and Y ≡ Y ց X. Let W be the random variable for the outcome of measuring
the environment register E in a Schmidt basis. Then,
S(W |AA′) = S(W |X A′) ≥ H(Y |X) = H(Y ց X |X ց Y ) and
S(W |BB′) = S(W |Y B′) ≥ H(X |Y ) = H(X ց Y |Y ց X) .
Proof. Let us write the non-leaking tripartite embedding as a function of Alice’s output
X = x as follows
|ψ〉ABEA′B′ =
∑
x
√
PX(x)|x〉A ⊗
∑
y
√
PY |X=x(y) |y〉B ⊗
∑
a
κx,ya |a〉A′ ⊗ |µx,y,a〉EB′ ,
(12)
where we assume without loss of generality that all κx,ya are real (and possible complex
phases are put into |µx,y,a〉). We claim that κx,ya = κxa, i.e. the coefficients do not depend
on y. To see this, let pxa = Pr (A
′ = a|X = x) where A′ denotes the classical outcome of
measuring register A′ in the computational basis. Suppose for a contradiction that there
exists y such that |κx,ya |2 6= pxa:
Pr (Y = y|X = x,A′ = a) = Pr (Y = y|X = x) Pr (A
′ = a|X = x, Y = y)
Pr (A′ = a|X = x)
=
Pr (Y = y|X = x)|κx,ya |2
pxa
6= Pr (Y = y|X = x) ,
which would contradict the fact that |ψ〉 is non-leaking. Hence, we can write |ψ〉 as
|ψ〉ABEA′B′ =
∑
x
√
PX(x)|x〉A
∑
a
κxa|a〉A′ |ηx,a〉BEB′ ,
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where
|ηx,a〉BEB′ =
∑
y
√
PY |X=x(y)|y〉B|µx,y,a〉
=
∑
y
√
PY |X=x(y)|y〉B
∑
i
√
λx,y,ai |ex,y,ai 〉E ⊗ |bx,y,ai 〉B′ ,
where in the last step, we wrote the bipartite states |µx,y,a〉EB′ in the Schmidt form.
Theorem 4.9 establishes that if |ψ〉 is non-leaking then
trE (|ηx,a〉〈ηx,a|BEB′) =
∑
y
PY |X=x(y)|y〉〈y|B ⊗ σyB′ . (13)
We claim that (13) implies that the subspaces Sx,ya = spani{|ex,y,ai 〉E}must be perpendicular
for different values of y. Let qxy :=
√
PY |X=x(y) be used to shorten the notation. We have
trE (|ηx,a〉〈ηx,a|BEB′) =
∑
y,y′
qxyq
x
y′ trE
(
|y〉〈y′|B ⊗ |µx,y,a〉
〈
µx,y
′,a
∣∣∣
EB′
)
=
∑
y,y′
qxyq
x
y′ trE
|y〉〈y′|B ⊗∑
i,j
|ex,y,ai 〉
〈
ex,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣
E
⊗ |bx,y,ai 〉
〈
bx,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣
B′

=
∑
y,y′
qxyq
x
y′ |y〉〈y′|B ⊗ trE
∑
i,j
|ex,y,ai 〉
〈
ex,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣
E
⊗ |bx,y,ai 〉
〈
bx,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣
B′

=
∑
y,y′
qxyq
x
y′ |y〉〈y′|B⊗
∑
h
〈ex,y,ah |
∑
i,j
|ex,y,ai 〉
〈
ex,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣
E
⊗ |bx,y,ai 〉
〈
bx,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣
B′
 |ex,y,ah 〉
=
∑
y,y′
qxyq
x
y′ |y〉〈y′|B ⊗
∑
i,j
〈
ex,y
′,a
j
∣∣∣ex,y,ai 〉⊗ |bx,y,ai 〉〈bx,y′,aj ∣∣∣
B′
. (14)
Clearly, if Sx,ya ⊥ Sx,y
′
a is not satisfied then there exists i 6= j, y 6= y′ such that 〈ex,y
′,a
j |ex,y,ai 〉 6=
0 and register B is not diagonal in the computational basis according (14).
It follows that for X = x, any A′ = a, and when Y = y is measured by Bob, the
environment E ends up in subspace Sx,ya of E which corresponds to Y = y unambiguously.
As W is the outcome of measuring E in the Schmidt basis, knowledge of W , X and A′
determines Y . Formally, we have 0 ≤ S(Y |WXA′) ≤ S(Y |WXA′) = 0 and it follows that
S(W |XA′) = S(W |XA′) + S(Y |WXA′)
= S(WY |XA′)
≥ S(Y |XA′)
= H(Y |X) ,
(15)
where the inequality holds due to the classicality of W and the last step is due to strict
correctness.
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The same argument with the roles of Alice and Bob reversed results in:
S(W |Y B′) ≥ H(X |Y ) . (16)
Equations (15) and (16) establish the inequalities of the statement.
To prove the statement’s equalities, consider Theorem 4.9 when Bob measures Y :
ρ˜A′AY =
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y) τ
x
A′ ⊗ |x, y〉〈x, y|AY ,
which obviously means that
ρ˜A′A =
∑
x
PX(x) τ
x
A′ ⊗ |x〉〈x|A .
Alice’s register A is therefore diagonal in the computational basis. It follows that
S(W |AA′) = S(W |XA′) .
A symmetric argument from (16) shows that
S(W |BB′) = S(W |Y B′) .
⊓⊔
Suppose Alice and Bob have access to an ideal functionality for PX,Y as a cryptographic
resource. What primitives can Alice and Bob implement without leakage given access to this
resource? Is it possible for them to “promote” the ideal functionality for PX,Y to a stronger
cryptographic primitive? Before answering this question in the negative, let us define what
we exactly mean by an ideal functionality for primitive PX,Y :
Definition 4.11. An ideal functionality ID(PX,Y ) for primitive PX,Y is a box that pro-
vides Alice and Bob with X and Y respectively and nothing more. In particular, the ideal
functionality never provides extra working registers (otherwise, extra registers could with-
out violating strict correctness provide additional cryptographic resources to Alice and Bob).
More formally,
ID(PX,Y ) =
∑
x,y
PX,Y (x, y)|x〉〈x|A ⊗ |y〉〈y|B .
The next theorem shows that one call to an ideal functionality is never sufficient for a
non-leaking implementation of a stronger primitive. In other words, quantum communication
and computation never allow to amplify an ideal classical two-party cryptographic primitive
into a stronger one without leakage.
Theorem 4.12. Let PX,Y and PX′,Y ′ be two primitives, where X ≡ X ց Y , Y ≡ Y ց X,
X ′ ≡ X ′ ց Y ′, and Y ′ ≡ Y ′ ց X ′. Suppose that H(X ′|Y ′) > H(X |Y ) or H(Y ′|X ′) >
H(Y |X). Then, any implementation of PX′,Y ′ using just one call to the ideal functionality
ID(PX,Y ) leaks information.
Proof. We may view the ideal functionality ID(PX,Y ) as a box that conceals its environment
to Alice and Bob. For instance, the state
|ψ〉EAˆBˆ =
∑
x,y
√
PXցY,YցX(x, y)|x, y〉E ⊗ |x, y〉AˆBˆ .
25
is a non-leaking embedding of PXցY,YցX with S(W | Aˆ) = H(Y |X) and S(W | Bˆ) =
H(X |Y ) where W is defined as above as the classical outcome when measuring the en-
vironment in the Schmidt basis.
Consider any strictly correct protocol implementing PX′,Y ′ where Alice and Bob purify
their actions but are otherwise honest. An execution of the protocol will produce a non-
leaking tripartite embedding of PX′,Y ′ . Just before the call to ID(PX,Y ), Alice’s internal
register A0 and Bob’s internal register B0 are such that
S(W |A0) = S(W |B0) = 0 ,
since the environment is in a pure state. Just after the call to ID(PX,Y ), Alice’s register A1
and Bob’s register B1 satisfy:
S(W |A1) = H(Y |X) and S(W |B1) = H(X |Y ) ,
since Aˆ ⊆ A1 and Bˆ ⊆ B1. Notice also that the state provided to Alice and Bob by ID(PX,Y )
is diagonal in the computational basis: the information is classical. It follows that Alice and
Bob can copy this information and keep it with them during the execution of the protocol
while remaining able to run the protocol in a honest-but-curious fashion. The Schmidt basis
for the environment remains the same after the call to ID(PX,Y ). It follows that at any
point t in the protocol evolution, Alice’s and Bob’s internal quantum registers At and Bt
respectively are such that:
S(W |At) ≤ H(Y |X) and S(W |Bt) ≤ H(X |Y ) . (17)
That is, S(W |At) and S(W |Bt) are non-increasing monotones for honest-but-curious quan-
tum players in secure two-party computation similar to H(Y |X) and H(X |Y ) in the clas-
sical case [WW04].
At the very last step tmax of the protocol, Atmax := A⊗A′ and Btmax := B⊗B′. Therefore,
S(W |AA′) ≤ H(Y |X) and S(W |BB′) ≤ H(X |Y ) .
SinceH(Y |X) < H(Y ′|X ′) orH(X |Y ) < H(X ′|Y ′), we conclude that either S(W |AA′) <
H(Y ′|X ′) or S(W |BB′) < H(X ′|Y ′). It follows by Corollary 4.10 that the implementation
of PX′,Y ′ must leak. ⊓⊔
As in the classical case [WW04], it is straightforward to use Theorem 4.12 in order to
determine a lower bound on the number of calls to a weaker primitive required to implement
a stronger one without leakage: PX′,Y ′ can be implemented without leakage by n calls to
PX,Y only if H(X
′|Y ′) ≤ nH(X |Y ) and H(Y ′|X ′) ≤ nH(Y |X).
4.4 Reducibility of Primitives and Their Leakage
This section is concerned with the following question: Given two primitives PX,Y and PX˜,Y˜
such that PX,Y is reducible to PX˜,Y˜ , what is the relationship between the leakage of PX,Y
and the leakage of PX˜,Y˜ ? We use the notion of reducibility in the following sense: We say
that a primitive PX,Y is reducible in the HBC model to a primitive PX˜,Y˜ if PX,Y can be
securely implemented in the HBC model from (one call to) a secure implementation of
PX˜,Y˜ . The above question can also be generalized to the case where PX,Y can be computed
from PX˜,Y˜ only with certain probability. Notice that the answer, even if we assume perfect
reducibility, is not captured in our previous result from Lemma 4.3, since an embedding
of PX˜,Y˜ is not necessarily an embedding of PX,Y (it might violate the strict correctness
condition). However, under certain circumstances, we can show that ∆PX˜,Y˜ ≥ ∆PX,Y .
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Theorem 4.13. Assume that primitives PX,Y and PX˜,Y˜ = PX˜0X˜1,Y˜0Y˜1 satisfy the condi-
tion: ∑
x,y:PX˜0,Y˜0|X˜1=x,Y˜1=y
≃PX,Y
PX˜1,Y˜1(x, y) ≥ 1− δ,
where the relation ≃ means that the two distributions are equal up to relabeling of the al-
phabet. Then, ∆PX˜,Y˜ ≥ (1− δ)∆PX,Y .
Proof. State |ψ〉A0A1B0B1 ∈ E(PX˜,Y˜ ) can be written in the form:
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈X ′
1
√
PX˜1(x)|x〉A1 |ψx〉A0B ,
where each |ψx〉 is a regular embedding of PX˜0Y˜0Y˜1|X˜1=x. Due to the Holevo bound (Theo-
rem 2.2), we have
S(Y˜ |A)ψ = S(Y˜ |A0A1)ψ ≤ S(Y˜ |A0, X˜1)ψ =
∑
x
PX˜1(x)S(Y˜ |A0, X˜1 = x)ψx ,
and we obtain for the leakage of |ψ〉 that
∆ψ(PX˜,Y˜ ) = H(Y˜ |X˜)− S(Y˜ |A)ψ
≥ H(Y˜ |X˜)−
∑
x
PX˜1 (x)S(Y˜ |A0, X˜1 = x)ψx
=
∑
x
PX˜1 (x)(H(Y˜ |X˜0, X˜1 = x) − S(Y˜ |A0, X˜1 = x)ψx)
=
∑
x
PX˜1 (x)∆ψx(PX˜0,Y˜0Y˜1|X˜1=x) .
By applying the same argument to each |ψx〉, we obtain that
∆ψ(PX˜,Y˜ ) ≥
∑
xy
PX˜1,Y˜1(x, y)∆ψx,y (PX˜0,Y˜0|X˜1=x,Y˜1=y) , (18)
where each |ψx,y〉 is a regular embedding of PX˜0,Y˜0|X˜1=x,Y˜1=y. For each (x, y) such that
PX˜0,Y˜0|X˜1=x,Y˜1=y ≃ PX,Y is satisfied, we get that
∆ψx,y (PX˜0,Y˜0|X˜1=x,Y˜1=y) ≥ ∆PX,Y .
Since
∑
x,y:PX˜0,Y˜0|X˜1=x,Y˜1=y
≃PX,Y PX˜1,Y˜1(x, y) ≥ 1− δ, we get from (18) that
∆ψ(PX˜,Y˜ ) ≥ (1− δ)PX,Y .
⊓⊔
Theorem 4.13 will allow to derive a lower bound on the leakage of 1-out-of-2 Oblivious
Transfer of r-bit strings in Section 5.
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5 The Leakage of Universal Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we exhibit lower bounds on the leakage of the following universal two-party
primitives.
String Rabin OT (rotr): [Rab81] Alice sends a random string of r bits to Bob who
receives it with probability 1/2, otherwise he receives a special symbol ⊥. Alice does not
learn any information about whether Bob has received the string she sent.
For x ∈ {0, 1}r and y ∈ {0, 1}r ∪ {⊥}:
P rot
r
X,Y (x, y) =
{
2−r−1 if x = y or y = ⊥,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to an execution of Rabin OT of a random
binary string of length r.
One-out-of-two String OT (1-2-otr): [Wie83,EGL82] Alice sends two random r-bit
strings to Bob who decides which of them he receives. Bob does not learn any informa-
tion about the other one of Alice’s strings and Alice does not learn which of the strings
has been received by Bob. We simply write 1-2-ot for the case of 1-out-of-2 oblivious
transfer of bits (r = 1).
For x0, x1, y ∈ {0, 1}r and c ∈ {0, 1}:
P ot
r
X,Y ((x0, x1), (c, y)) =
{
2−2r−1 if y = xc,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to an execution of one-out-of-two r-bit
string OT upon random inputs.
Additive sharing of AND (sand): [PR94] Alice and Bob choose their respective input
bits x and y, and receive the output bits a resp. b such that a ⊕ b = x ∧ y and Pr[a =
0] = 1/2. They do not get any other information.
For x, y, a, b ∈ {0, 1}:
P nlX,Y ((x, a), (y, b)) =
{
1
8 if xy = a⊕ b,
0 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to the generation of an additive sharing
for the and of two random bits.
Noisy one-out-of-two OT (1-2-otp): Alice sends two bits to Bob who decides which of
them he wants to receive. The selected bit is transmitted to him over a noisy channel
with noise rate p. Bob does not learn any information about the other one of Alice’s
bits and Alice does not learn any information about Bob’s selection bit.
For x0, x1, y, c ∈ {0, 1} and p ∈ (0, 1/2):
P
otp
X,Y ((x0, x1), (c, y)) =
{
1−p
8 if y = xc,
p
8 otherwise,
is the joint probability distribution associated to an execution of one-out-of-two OT
where the selected bit is received through a binary symmetric channel with error rate p.
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primitive leaking at least comments
rot
1 (h( 1
4
)− 1
2
) ≈ 0.311 same leakage for all regular embeddings
rot
r (1−O(r2−r)) same leakage for all regular embeddings
1-2-ot, sand 1
2
minimized by canonical embedding
1-2-ot
r (1−O(r2−r)) (suboptimal) lower bound
1-2-otp
(
1/2−p−
√
p(1−p)
)
2
8 ln 2
if p < sin2(pi/8) ≈ 0.15, (suboptimal) lower bound
Table 1. Lower bounds on the leakage for universal two-party primitives
Table 1 summarizes the lower bounds on the leakage of these primitives (the derivations
can be found in Appendix A). We note that Wolf and Wullschleger [WW05b] have shown
that a randomized 1-2-ot can be transformed by local operations into an additive sharing
of an AND (here called sand). Therefore, our results for 1-2-ot below also apply to sand.
1-2-ot
r and 1-2-otp are primitives where the direct evaluation of the leakage for a gen-
eral embedding |ψθ〉 is hard, because the number of possible phases increases exponentially
in the number of qubits. Instead of computing S(A) directly, we derive (suboptimal) lower
bounds on the leakage.
For the primitive P
otp
X,Y , our lower bound on the leakage only holds for p < sin
2(π/8) ≈
0.15. Notice that in reality, the leakage is strictly positive for any embedding of P
otp
X,Y with
p < 1/4, since for p < 1/4, P
otp
X,Y is a non-trivial primitive. On the other hand, P
ot1/4
X,Y is a
trivial primitive implemented securely by the following protocol in the classical HBC model:
1. Alice chooses randomly between her input bits x0 and x1 and sends the chosen value xa
to Bob.
2. Bob chooses his selection bit c uniformly at random and sets y := xa.
Equality xc = y is satisfied if either a = c, which happens with probability 1/2, or if a 6= c
and xa = x1−a, which happens with probability 1/4. Since the two events are disjoint, it
follows that xc = y with probability 3/4 and that the protocol implements P
ot1/4
X,Y . The
implementation is clearly secure against honest-but-curious Alice, since she does not receive
any message from Bob. It is also secure against Bob, since he receives only one bit from Alice.
By letting Alice randomize the value of the bit she is sending, the players can implement
P
otp
X,Y securely for any value 1/4 < p ≤ 1/2.
6 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have provided a quantitative extension of qualitative impossibility results for two-party
quantum cryptography. All non-trivial classical primitives leak information when imple-
mented by quantum protocols. Notice that demanding a protocol to be non-leaking does
in general not imply the privacy of the players’ outputs. For instance, consider a proto-
col implementing 1-2-ot but allowing a curious receiver with probability 12 to learn both
bits simultaneously or with probability 12 to learn nothing about them. Such a protocol
for 1-2-ot would be non-leaking but nevertheless insecure. Consequently, Theorem 4.6 not
only tells us that any quantum protocol implementing a non-trivial primitive must be in-
secure, but also that a privacy breach will reveal itself as leakage. Our framework allows
to quantify the leakage of any two-party quantum protocol strict-correctly implementing a
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primitive. Our impossibility results are different than common ones since they only rely on
the strict correctness of the protocol, not on the perfect privacy of a protocol against one
party . Moreover, the generic attack that allows to show leakage is simply implemented by
purifying the parties’ actions. Furthermore, we present lower bounds on the leakage of some
strictly correct universal two-party primitives.
A natural open question is to find a way to identify good embeddings for a given primitive.
Based on the examples of rotr and 1-2-ot, it is tempting to conjecture the following.
Conjecture 6.1. The leakage of any primitive PX,Y is minimized by its canonical embedding.
The conjecture agrees with the geometric intuition that the minimal pairwise distinguisha-
bility of quantum states in a mixture minimizes the von Neumann entropy of the mixture.
However, Jozsa and Schlienz have shown that this intuition is sometimes incorrect [JS00].
In a quantum system of dimension at least three, we can have the following situation: For
two sets of pure states {|ui〉}ni=1 and {|vi〉}ni=1 satisfying |〈ui|uj〉| ≤ |〈vi|vj〉| for all i, j, there
exist probabilities pi such that for ρu :=
∑n
i=1 pi|ui〉〈ui|, ρv :=
∑n
i=1 pi|vi〉〈vi|, it holds that
S(ρu) < S(ρv). As we can see, although each pair |ui〉, |uj〉 is more distinguishable than
the corresponding pair |vi〉, |vj〉, the overall ρu provides us with less uncertainty than ρv. It
follows that although for the canonical embedding |ψ0〉 =
∑
y |ϕy〉|y〉 of PX,Y the mutual
overlaps |〈ϕy |ϕy′〉| are clearly maximized, it does not necessarily imply that S(A) in this
case is minimal over E(PX,Y ). It is an interesting open question to find a primitive whose
canonical embedding does not minimize the leakage or to prove that no such primitive exists.
In particular, how far can the leakage of the canonical embedding be from the best one?
Such a characterization, even if only applicable to special primitives, would allow to lower
bound their leakage and would also help to understand the power of two-party quantum
cryptography in a more concise way.
A very natural generalization of our approach would be to see what happens when strict
correctness is relaxed.
Conjecture 6.2. Any correct protocol for PX,Y leaks as much as a strictly correct protocol
for PX,Y .
The most obvious relaxation would be to consider as correct any |ψ〉 ∈ HAB ⊗ HA′B′
that produces (x, y) with probability PX,Y (x, y) when registers A and B are measured but
registers A′ and B′ can provide extra information about Y and X respectively. Remember
that this is equivalent to allowing for the quantum Markov chain conditions A′ ↔ X ↔ Y
and B′ ↔ Y ↔ X not to hold anymore. Would it be possible to find such a |ψ〉 with the
property that for any regular embedding |φ〉 ∈ E(PX,Y ):
∆ψ(PX,Y ) < ∆φ(PX,Y ) ?
A positive answer would reveal that some primitive PX,Y may be implemented with mini-
mum leakage when viewed as a marginal in some larger probability distribution PXX′,Y Y ′ .
A negative answer would rather show that all our results hold unaffected for the standard
notion of correctness. Note however that the leakage is no more symmetric for the standard
notion of correctness.
It would also be interesting to find a measure of cryptographic non-triviality for two-
party primitives and see how it relates to the minimum leakage of any implementation by
quantum protocols. For instance, is it true that quantum protocols for primitive PX,Y leak
more if the distance between PX,Y and any trivial primitive increases?
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Another question we leave for future research is to define and investigate other notions
of leakage, e.g. in the one-shot setting instead of in the asymptotic regime (as outlined
in Footnote 13). Results in the one-shot setting have already been established for data
compression [RW05], channel capacities [RWW06], state-merging [WR07,Ber08] and other
(quantum-) information-theoretic tasks.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to find more applications for the concept of leakage,
considered also for protocols using an environment as a trusted third party. In this direction,
we have shown in Theorem 4.12 that any two-party quantum protocol for a given primitive,
using a black box for an “easier” primitive, leaks information. Lower-bounding this leakage
is an interesting open question. We might also ask how many copies of the “easier” primitive
are needed to implement the “harder” primitive by a quantum protocol, which would give
us an alternative measure of non-triviality for two-party primitives.
The approach used in this paper cannot easily be applied to cryptographic primitives
modeled by unitary transforms. Our approach is specialized to deal with classical primitives.
It is an open question to determine the leakage of protocols implementing some unitary
primitive. The few impossibility proofs for unitary primitives that we are aware of simply
establish that perfect privacy cannot be achieved. For example, it is shown in [DNS10]
that quantum SWAP is impossible (in fact, any unitary that never allows any of the party
to recover their input state). It would be very interesting to investigate the landscape of
possibilities and impossibilities for unitary primitives and see how it relates to the one for
classical primitives. These two worlds might be very different17.
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A Leakage of Universal Primitives
A.1 Exact calculations
First, we look at the leakage of the embeddings of Rabin String OT (rotr).
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Theorem A.1. Any embedding of P rot
r
X,Y is at least (1 − O(r2−r))-leaking. For r = 1 any
embedding is at least (h(14 ) − 12 ) ≈ 0.311-leaking. Furthermore, the leakage is the same for
all embeddings of P rot
r
X,Y .
Proof. Let
|ψ〉 = 1
2
r+1
2
∑
x∈{0,1}r
eiθ(x,x)|xx〉 + 1
2
r+1
2
 ∑
x∈{0,1}r
eiθ(x,⊥)|x〉
 |⊥〉 ,
where ⊥ denotes an erasure, be a general form of an embedding of P rotrX,Y .
Define |ϕ〉 := 1
2r/2
∑
x∈{0,1}r e
iθ(x,⊥)|x〉. If Bob receives the value of Alice’s string suc-
cessfully, Alice gets an ensemble ρ0 = 12r
∑
x∈{0,1}r |x〉〈x|. If an erasure occurs on Bob’s side,
Alice gets ρ1 = |ϕ〉〈ϕ|. We find S(A) by computing the eigenvalues of ρA := 12 (ρ0 + ρ1).
Since ρ0 = 12r IA, |v〉 is an eigenvector of ρA if and only if it is an eigenvector of ρ1. If |v〉
is an eigenvector of ρ1 then either a) |v〉 = eiθ|ϕ〉 or b) 〈v|ϕ〉 = 0. If a) is the case, then
ρA|v〉 = 1
2
(ρ0|v〉+ ρ1|v〉) = 1
2
(
1 +
1
2r
)
|v〉 ,
whereas in the case b),
ρA|v〉 = 1
2
(ρ0|v〉+ ρ1|v〉) = 1
2r+1
.
The state ρA has eigenvalues { 12 + 12r+1 , 12r+1 }, where 12r+1 has multiplicity 2r− 1. S(A) can
then be computed as follows:
S(A) = −
(
1
2
+
1
2r+1
)
log
(
1
2
+
1
2r+1
)
+
2r − 1
2r+1
(r + 1)
=
(
1
2
+
1
2r+1
)(
1− 1
ln 2 · 2r + o
(
1
2r
))
+
r + 1
2
− r + 1
2r+1
=
r
2
+ 1−O
( r
2r
)
.
Since I(X ;Y ) = r2 , for the leakage we get:
∆ψ(P
rot
r
X,Y ) = S(A)− I(X ;Y ) = 1− O
( r
2r
)
.
As we can see, the leakage does not depend on the phase-function θ. ⊓⊔
In the following theorem we minimize the leakage of an embedding of P otX,Y .
Theorem A.2. Any |ψ〉 ∈ E(P otX,Y ) is at least 12 -leaking. The leakage is minimized by the
canonical embedding.
Proof. Let
|ψ〉 = 1
2
√
2
∑
x0,x1,c∈{0,1}
eiθ(x0x1,cxc)|x0x1〉|cxc〉
be a regular embedding of P otX,Y . Without loss of generality assume that θ(00, 00) = 0.
Notice that for the local phase-changing transformations
UA := |00〉〈00|+ exp(iθ(01, 00))|01〉〈01|+ exp(i(θ(10, 10)− θ(00, 10)))|10〉〈10|
+ exp(i(θ(10, 10) + θ(11, 01)− θ(00, 10)− θ(10, 01)))|11〉〈11|,
UB := |00〉〈00|+ exp(i(θ(00, 10) + θ(10, 01)− θ(10, 10)))|01〉〈01|
+ exp(iθ(00, 10))|10〉〈10|+ exp(i(θ(01, 11)− θ(01, 00)))|11〉〈11|,
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we get
UA ⊗ UB|ψ〉 = |ψ′〉 = 1
2
(|0+〉|00〉+ |1+〉|01〉+ |+0〉|10〉+ |0〉+ e
iω|1〉√
2
|1〉|11〉) ,
where ω = θ(00, 10) + θ(01, 00) + θ(10, 01) + θ(11, 11)− θ(01, 01)− θ(10, 10)− θ(11, 01).
Let A′ denote Alice’s quantum system for Alice and Bob sharing |ψ′〉. Since S(A) =
S(A′), we can minimize S(A′) in order to minimize S(A). Assume that Alice and Bob share
|ψ′〉. For Bob’s selection bit c = 0, Alice gets an ensemble ρ0 = 12 (|0+〉〈0+| + |1+〉〈1+|),
whereas for c = 1, she gets ρ1 =
1
2 (|+0〉〈+0| + (|01〉 + eiω|11〉)(〈01| + e−iω〈11|)), where
ρA′ =
1
2 (ρ0 + ρ1). By solving the characteristic equation of ρA′ we get the set of eigenvalues
{ 14 (1± cos ω4 ), 14 (1± sin ω4 )}. S(A′) can then be expressed as follows:
S(A′) = 1 +
h(1−cos(ω/4)2 ) + h(
1−sin(ω/4)
2 )
2
.
By computing the second derivative of f(x) = h(1−
√
x
2 ), we get that f
′′(x) ≤ 0 in [0, 1],
implying that f is concave in [0, 1]. For α ∈ [0, 1], Jensen’s inequality yields f(0)+f(1)2 ≤
f(α), and therefore, f(0)+f(1)2 ≤ f(α)+f(1−α)2 . Consequently, the minimum of h(1−cos(ω/4)2 )+
h(1−sin(ω/4)2 ) = f(cos
2 ω
4 ) + f(sin
2 ω
4 ) is achieved for ω = 0 and in this case, S(A
′) = 32 .
Finally, we can conclude that the leakage is minimal for the canonical embedding and
∆ψ(PX,Y ) = S(A)− I(X ;Y ) = S(A′)− I(X ;Y ) ≥ 32 − 1 = 12 . ⊓⊔
There is also a more direct way to interpret this quantity in the case of the canonical
embedding |ψ0〉 for P otX,Y : If Alice and Bob share a single copy of |ψ0〉 then there exist
POVMs for both of them which reveal Bob’s selection bit to Alice, and the XOR of Alice’s
bits to Bob, both with probability 12 . Let |Φ±〉 = 1√2 (|00〉 ± |11〉), |Ψ±〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉)
denote the Bell states, and |±〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉). Observe that the canonical embedding |ψ0〉
of P otX,Y can be expressed as follows:
|ψ0〉 = 1
2
∣∣Ψ−〉⊗ |Ψ−〉 − |Φ−〉√
2
+
1
2
∣∣Φ−〉⊗ |Ψ+〉 − |Φ+〉√
2
+
1√
2
|++〉|++〉.
In order to get the value x0 ⊕ x1 of Alice’s bits x0 and x1, Bob can use POVM B =
{B0,B1,B?} where B0 := 12 (|Ψ−〉 − |Φ−〉)(〈Ψ−| − 〈Φ−|), B1 := 12 (|Ψ+〉 − |Φ+〉)(〈Ψ+| − 〈Φ+|),
and B? : = |++〉〈++|. It is easy to verify that Bob gets outcome Bz for z ∈ {0, 1} (in
which case x0 ⊕ x1 = z with certainty) with probability 12 . Alice’s POVM can be defined
as A = {A0,A1,A?} where A0 : = |−+〉〈−+|, A1 : = |+−〉〈+−|, and A? : = I2 − A0 − A1.
By inspection we easily find that the probability for Alice to get Bob’s selection bit is
1− tr((A? ⊗ I2)|ψ0〉〈ψ0|) = 12 . For any regular embedding of P otX,Y we can construct similar
POVMs revealing the XOR of Alice’s bits to Bob and Bob’s selection bit to Alice with
probability strictly more than 14 .
A.2 Lower Bounds
Theorem A.3. Any embedding |ψ〉 of P otrX,Y is (1 −O(r2−r))-leaking.
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Proof. We use Theorem 4.13 to show that any (regular) embedding of P ot
r
X,Y leaks at least
as much as some regular embedding of P rot
r
X,Y . Let (A0, A1) and B denote Alice’s and Bob’s
respective registers. Then |ψ〉A0A1B ∈ E(P ot
r
X,Y ) can be written in the form:
|ψ〉 = 1
2r/2
∑
x∈{0,1}r
|x〉A1 |ψx〉A0B ,
where each
|ψx〉 = 1
2(r+1)/2
∑
x′∈{0,1}r
(
eiθ(x
′,x,0)|x′〉A0 |0, x′〉B + eiθ(x′,x,1)|x′〉A0 |1, x〉
B
)
can be viewed as a regular embedding of P rot
r
X,Y . According to Theorem 4.13 and Theorem A.1,
we get that
∆P otrX,Y
≥ ∆P rotrX,Y = 1−O(r/2
r) .
⊓⊔
Theorem A.4. If p < 12 − 12√2 ≈ 0.1464 then ∆P otpX,Y ≥
(
1/2−p−
√
p(1−p)
)
2
8 ln 2 .
Proof. Before starting with the actual proof, we formulate a useful statement, relating two
measures of uncertainty of a quantum ensemble.
Theorem A.5 (Average Encoding Theorem [KNTsZ01]). Let E denote a quantum
system storing the quantum part of a cq-state ρXE =
∑
x∈X PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE. Then∑
x
PX(x)‖ρE − ρxE‖1 ≤
√
2(ln 2)S(X ;E) .
In order to prove Theorem A.4, we first notice that for any regular embedding of PX,Y0Y1
such that Y0 and Y1 are independent, it holds that
S(A;Y0Y1) ≥ S(A;Y0) + S(A;Y1) . (19)
We can write
S(A;Y0) + S(A;Y1) = H(Y0) +H(Y1)− S(Y0|A)− S(Y1|A)
= H(Y0Y1)− S(Y0|A)− S(Y1|A)
≤ H(Y0Y1)− S(Y0Y1|A) = S(A;Y0Y1) ,
which proves Inequality (19).
Let X,Y0, Y1 be random variables corresponding to Alice’s pair of bits, Bob’s selection
bit, and its value, respectively. For P
otp
X,Y we have that I(X ;Y0Y1) = 1−h(p). As the selection
bit Y0 and the value Y1 are independent, we can use (19) to lower bound S(A;Y0Y1) as follows
S(A;Y0Y1) ≥ S(A;Y0) + S(A;Y1) ≥ S(A;Y0) + (1 − h(p)) .
Hence, for computing the lower bound on S(A;Y0Y1), we only need to compute the lower
bound on S(A;Y0). A state |ψ〉 ∈ E(P otpX,Y ) can be written as
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ0〉AB1 |0〉B0 + |ψ1〉AB1 |1〉B0) .
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Let ρ0A := trB1 |ψ0〉〈ψ0| and ρ1A := trB1 |ψ1〉〈ψ1|. By applying Theorem A.5 from above,
we get that
‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖1 ≤
√
8(ln 2)S(A;Y0) ,
and therefore,
‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖21
8 ln 2
≤ S(A;Y0). (20)
The trace norm of ρ0A − ρ1A yields an upper bound on the entries of the matrix:
|(ρ0A − ρ1A)ij | ≤ ‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖1. (21)
We can write the state |ψ〉 in the form:
|ψ〉 = 1
2
∑
y0,y1
|ϕy0,y1〉A|y0, y1〉B0B1 ,
where
|ϕ0,y〉 =
√
1− p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(y,x,0,y)|y, x〉A|0, y〉B0B1 +
√
p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(y,x,0,1−y)|y, x〉A|0, 1− y〉B0B1
|ϕ1,y〉 =
√
1− p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(x,y,1,y)|x, y〉A|1, y〉B0B1 +
√
p
2
1∑
x=0
eiθ(x,y,1,1−y)|x, y〉A|1, 1− y〉B0B1 .
By evaluating the individual matrix entries of (ρ0A − ρ1A) we get a simple lower bound on
|(ρ0A − ρ1A)ij | for i 6= j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}:
|(ρ0A − ρ1A)ij | ≥
1− 2p
4
−
√
(1 − p)p
2
(22)
hence, from (21) follows that
‖ρ0A − ρ1A‖1 ≥
1− 2p
4
−
√
(1− p)p
2
,
yielding due to (19) and (20) that
S(A;Y0Y1) ≥ 1− h(p) + S(A;Y0) ≥ 1− h(p) + (1/2− p−
√
(1 − p)p)2
32 ln 2
.
The lower-bound is non-trivial if 1/2−p−
√
(1− p)p > 0, which is true for p < 12 − 12√2 .
The results yields the following lower-bound on the leakage of P
otp
X,Y :
∆P otpX,Y
≥ (1/2− p−
√
(1 − p)p)2
32 ln 2
.
However, this lower-bound is very loose, since for p = 0 we get that
∆P otX,Y ≥
1
128 ln2
≈ 0.011 ,
which is much weaker than the optimal
∆P otX,Y ≥
1
2
.
⊓⊔
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It remains to mention that by using more careful analysis of the phases of |ϕ0.y〉 and
|ϕ1,y〉, the lower bound on the absolute value of the outside-diagonal entries from (22) can be
improved, yielding a non-trivial lower bound on the leakage for p > 0.1464 and eventually,
even for any p < 1/4.
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